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Foreword
During the industrialisation boom in the 1960s, pollution from industrial activity became an
increasing concern for many developed economies. This period is considered by econom-
ists as the beginning of the new field of specialisation in economics named environmental
economics. Since those early years, environmental economists have been aware of rapid
economic growth and its consequences to the environment. Environmental economics fo-
cuses mainly on the efficient allocation of environmental and natural resources, and how
alternative environmental policies deal with environmental damage, such as air pollution,
water quality, solid waste, toxic substances, and global warming. In this context, it has
become a major objective for policymakers and economists around the world that have
to deal with issues such as inefficient natural resource allocation, market failure, negative
externalities, and management of public goods. All this has led to the establishment of
new environmental bodies among world economies in 1972, named the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).
The literature on the environmental economics’ studies dates back to the pioneering
works of Adam Smith (1776), Nicolas de Condorcet (1785), Thomas Robert Malthus (1798),
David Ricardo (1817), and John Stuart Mill (1848) that use externality arguments in the
context of the policy analysis of environmental issues. This thesis contributes to the liter-
ature of environmental economics with three studies organised as independent chapters
identifying several environmental economics issues. The remainder of the current document
is as follows:1
Chapter 1 studies the market power in Californian’s water market.2 In California
the water market is thin. Thus, we provide an estimation of this thin water market. The
main hypothesis is that market frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water
marketing. By using a Nash-Cournot model, we derive a closed-form solution for the extent
of market power in a typical water market setting. This solution is used to estimate market
power in a newly assembled dataset on California’s water economy. The results of this study
indicate that under the assumptions of the Cournot model, market power in this thin water
market is limited. The robustness tests prove the same result.
1Note that each chapter is independent of the others, so each chapter has an introduction and a conclusion. Due
to the fact that each chapter corresponds to a completely independent article, some repetitions are generated
mainly in the definitions.
2This Chapter is derived from the article: "Market power in California’s water market." (2021), joint with Ansink,
E., Houba, H., Hagerty, N., and Bos, C. S.
xi
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Chapter 2 analyses the impact of environmental regulatory capture on innovation and
emissions for the case of the automobile industry.3 The hypothesis states that in the light
of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, a common belief that has formed is that regulatory
capture in the control and setting of emission standards has led to lower pollution abatement
and less environmental innovation in gasoline and diesel combustion engines. Under a
multi-product monopoly, the results indicate that regulatory capture only leads to more
emissions and less innovation effort. The opposite is true under oligopoly competition.
These results differ due to a competition intensifying effect, which is only present with at
least two firms in the market. This effect comes from the fact that a consumer-orientated
regulator sets higher emission standards for diesel cars, which leads to higher output and
more intensive competition among car producers. Consequently, because emission standards
and environmental innovation are strategic substitutes, car producers reduce their innovation
effort. This result means that the hypothesis is false.
Chapter 3 provides a comparison of two policy instruments such as emission standards
and acquisition taxes for the automobile market.4 We investigate under which situation and
instrument the adoption of electric vehicles, innovation effort and social welfare is higher. A
Cournot oligopoly model with multi-product firms that vertically differentiate their products
is used to derive the equilibrium results. The results indicate that emission standards offer
greater innovation incentives, total output, firms’ profits, and social welfare as compared to
acquisition taxes. Acquisition taxes allow a major adoption of electric vehicles than emission
standards. However, as long as environmental damages are not too large and when the tax
revenues are redistributed, consumers prefer an acquisition tax. Otherwise, they are better
off under an emission standard.
3This Chapter is derived from the article: "The impact of environmental regulatory capture on innovation and
emissions: The case of the automobile industry." (2021), joint with Theilen, B.
4This Chapter is derived from the article: "Taxes versus emission standards: Welfare consequences and innovation
incentives of electric vehicle adoption policies." (2021), joint with Theilen, B.
xii
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Chapter 1
Market power in California’s water market
Overview. We estimate market power in California’s thin water market. Market
frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-
Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical
water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly
assembled dataset on California’s water economy. We show that under the assumptions of
the Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.
JEL classification: C72; D43; Q25.
Keywords: Water markets, Market power, California, Cournot-Nash.
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Chapter 1. Market power in California’s water market
1.1 Introduction
We estimate the extent and impact of market power in California’s thin water market. In
this water market, both water leases and permanent sales of water rights reallocate water
from lower to higher value uses. Such reallocation is known to substantially increase the
efficiency of water use (see e.g., Vaux Jr. and Howitt, 1984; Jenkins et al., 2004), but it may
be obstructed by various market frictions. There is ample evidence, both from California and
other regions, and both for ground- and surface water trading, that market power may be an
important source of friction in water markets (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Easter et al.,
1999; Jacoby et al., 2004; Holland, 2006; Chakravorty et al., 2009; Bruno and Sexton, 2020).
Under the premise that market frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water
marketing, we seek to identify the extent and impact of such market power in California.
Inspired by the model set-up of Ansink and Houba (2012), we introduce a Nash-Cournot
model of water transactions. Under two main assumptions, discussed below, this model
allows us to derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical water
market setting. One novelty is that we write this solution in terms of willingness-to-pay
and -accept. We subsequently apply our model to a newly assembled dataset on California’s
water economy by Hagerty (2019). The data that we use is a 1993-2015 panel data on water
transactions in California, with detailed information on quantities and prices at the water
district-level, combined with detailed spatial data on locations of buying and selling districts
as well as geographical factors that may affect market power. The data allows us to control,
amongst others, for main water uses of buying and selling districts, and various types of
associated transaction costs. The results of our estimation allow us, ultimately, to estimate
Lerner indices for California’s water market.
Our main approach starts with two main assumptions, both of which will be relaxed later
on. One assumption is that we fix the side of the market where market power resides. Our
base model assumes buyer market power, a belief held by many stakeholders and supported
by previous literature (see e.g., Tomkins and Weber, 2010; Hansen et al., 2014; Hagerty,
2019). To check the relevance of this assumption, we also employ a model specification
where we allow for market power on both sides; we find support for buyer power only.
The second main assumption is that we use linear demand, originating from a quadratic
benefit function of water use. This functional form is commonplace in the water economics
literature and allows for a straightforward empirical strategy to derive our results. Constant
linear demand across selling districts may not be realistic, however, and therefore, we relax
this assumption in an alternative specification where, instead, we impose constant price
elasticity. This alternative specification, with constant price elasticity, is presented as part of
a larger class of model specifications featuring homogeneous demand, for which we present
a closed-form solution as well.
An important methodological advantage of our model is that we do not rely on a
2
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Chapter 1. Market power in California’s water market
conjectural variations approach that employs consistent conjectures (Bresnahan, 1989). This
approach is not compatible with standard notions of rational behaviour since the game
theory revolution (see e.g., Lindh, 1992).1 In addition, the model that we propose can be
adapted and applied to other endowment economies, including permit markets.
Our results show that market power in the Californian water market is limited. Our
main specification implies that buyer power yields an average mark-down of 6% of the
transaction price. This result is obtained for the linear model, but continues to hold for the
non-linear specification and is robust to other model modifications. Our result is surprising
in the sense that the thinness of water markets, including California’s, is conventionally
associated with higher possibilities of exploiting market power. It is also important in the
sense that water market reform need not take into account market power but can focus
on other factors instead, most notably transaction costs (Carey et al., 2002; Regnacq et al.,
2016; Hagerty, 2019; Leonard et al., 2019).
We first introduce the model and our main model specification in Section 1.2. Next,
we present the data in Section 1.3 and our empirical strategy in Section 1.4. Subsequently,
we present model results in Section 1.5, focusing on our estimation of Lerner indices for
California’s water market. This main result is compared with a conjectural variations approach
in Section 1.6 and checked for robustness in Section 1.7. In Section 1.8, we conclude.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 A model of market power in water markets
We develop a Nash-Cournot model of water transactions in order to derive an index for the
extent of market power in a typical water market setting. Consider a water market with
water transactions between sellers at origins o = 1,2, . . . , No and buyers at destinations
d = 1,2, . . . , Nd . Water is a homogeneous good and purchases from different sellers are
perfect substitutes. Both sellers and buyers have entitlements of water, denoted either eo > 0
or ed ≥ 0, depending upon their role. Although variation in rainfall and snow-melt may cause
endowments to change over time, we suppress time subscripts in this section to keep notation
simple. The amount of water sold by seller o to buyer d is denoted qod ≥ 0. Obviously, sellers
cannot sell more water than their entitlements, i.e.,
∑Nd
d=1 qod ≤ eo.
Water use by buyers consists of their own entitlement plus purchased water: Qd ≡
ed +
∑No
o=1 qod . Buyers’ benefit from using this total sum of water equals fd (Qd), which
1In Hagerty (2019), the same dataset is analysed, but the focus is on the impact of transaction costs in obstructing
water markets. As a robustness check, the potential impact of market power as an alternative explanation for
market frictions is explored, using an approach that employs consistent conjectures. Other papers, including
Bruno and Sexton (2020), use this same approach.
3
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
Françeska Tomori
Chapter 1. Market power in California’s water market
is increasing in the neighbourhood of ed (buyers are unsatiated at ed), strictly concave,
and twice continuously differentiable in Qd . For later reference, we introduce the buyer’s
willingness-to-pay, denoted WTP, which is defined as the partial derivative of net benefits
w.r.t. water use. Formally,
WTPd (Qd) = f
′
d (Qd) . (1.1)
In any bilateral trade, buyers do not pay more than their WTPd through the transaction-
specific price pod ≤ f ′d (Qd).
Water use by sellers consists of their own entitlement minus sold water: Qo ≡ eo −
∑Nd
d=1 qod . Sellers’ benefit from using the unsold amount of water equals fo (Qo), which is
increasing in the neighbourhood of eo (sellers are unsatiated at eo), strictly concave, and
twice continuously differentiable in Qo. Sellers’ net benefits of water use are now given by
fo (Qo) plus revenues from selling water, introduced below. For later reference, we introduce
the seller’s willingness-to-accept, denoted WTA, which is defined as the partial derivative of
net benefits w.r.t. water use. Formally,
WTAo (Qo) = f
′
o (Qo) . (1.2)
In any bilateral trade, sellers must be financially compensated for these opportunity costs
through the transaction-specific price pod ≥ f ′o (Qo).
Recall that we consider the case where buyers hold all market power. In this case, the
market clearing price must equal the seller’s WTA:
pod =WTAo (Qo) . (1.3)
Buyer d ’s expenditure on buying water from seller o is then given by qod ·WTAo (Qo). Buyers







qod ·WTAo (Qo) . (1.4)
Using the positive relation between Qd and qod as well as the negative relation between Qo
and qod , a buyer’s first-order condition w.r.t. Qd (implicitly, qod) for an interior solution is
given by2
f ′d (Qd)−WTAo (Qo) + qod ·WTA
′
o (Qo) = 0. (1.5)
Substituting (1.1) into (1.5) and rewriting yields
WTPd (Qd) =WTAo (Qo)− qod ·WTA′o (Qo) (1.6)
≥WTAo (Qo) .
2The first-order conditions for the boundary solution qod = 0 have the weak inequality ≤ replacing the equality.
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Substituting (1.3) into (1.6), we now have the following system that we will use in Section 1.4:
pod =WTAo (Qo) , (1.7a)
pod =WTPd (Qd) + qod ·WTA′o (Qo) . (1.7b)
Recall that WTA′o (Qo)< 0, so that the last term of (1.7b) is negative.
The wedge between buyers’ WTP and sellers’ WTA reflects the possible price range for
each transaction. Under our assumption of buyer power, the realised price equals the seller’s
WTA, the lowest possible price. We therefore use the wedge to construct our measure of
market power, which can be interpreted as the Lerner index applied to our model (note the













This Lerner index is the main result of our theoretical model. In Section 1.4, we will use
the system of equations (1.7) to estimate WTA′o (Qo) which we then use in (1.8) to measure
market power in California’s water market.
Our model is illustrated in Figure 1.1. With two types of districts (buyers and sellers)
and one good (water), whose supply is given, our model is an endowment economy and so
we can visualise it in a chart with a secondary mirrored primary axis, while total available
water is on the horizontal axis. Demand for water is displayed using the WTAo (Qo) curve for
sellers and the WTPd (Qd) curve for buyers. Starting from water endowments eo and ed in
Figure 1.1, water transactions increase buyers’ water consumption and decrease sellers’ water
consumption, while closing the wedge between buyers’ WTP and sellers’ WTA. Compared
with the competitive equilibrium, buyer power implies a lower transaction volume, which
leaves a positive wedge, as discussed in this section and as illustrated in the figure.
1.2.2 Main specification
The preferred specification of our model uses quadratic benefit functions for both buyers
and sellers. This specification allows to estimate a linear model, as explained in Section 1.4.
Our proposed benefit functions allow for heterogeneity across buyers and sellers as well as
over time, which is why we add time subscripts from here on.
For each origin we have fot(Qot) = Qot(αot −
1
2δQot), where αot = φo + βt + vot
captures heterogeneity between different sellers and time periods, while parameter δ is
kept constant. This benefit function implies that f ′ot(Qot) = αot −δQot , which is the sellers’
WTA in (1.2). Similarly, for each destination we have fd t(Qd t) = Qd t(ad t −
1
2γQd t), with
ad t = ψd + βt + ud t , and therefore f ′d t(Qd t) = ad t − γQd t , which is the buyers’ WTP in
5
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Figure 1.1: Endowments and Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
p














Stylised visualisation of endowments (blue) and Nash-Cournot equilibrium (red), where p+
equals p∗ plus the wedge WTPd(Q∗d)−WTAo(Q
∗
o).
(1.1). Note that in Appendix 1.9, we generalise our main model specification to allow for
asymmetry in terms of benefit parameters γ and δ. We do so after presenting the solution to
the symmetric version of our main specification in Appendix 1.9.
The sufficient and necessary condition for positive quantities in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is that f ′d t(ed t)> f
′
ot(eot), which implies
ad t − γed t > αot −δeot . (1.9)
The interpretation is that the marginal benefit of water use at the initial entitlement of each
destination exceeds the marginal benefit of water use at the initial entitlement of each origin.
In other words, trade is (marginally) beneficial at the initial entitlement levels.
1.3 Data
We apply our model using newly assembled data on California’s water economy, first described
by Hagerty (2019). We mainly use three datasets. The first is a proprietary dataset compiled
by WestWater Research, LLC, listing prices, volumes, and other information related to
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Californian water transactions. The second is a dataset compiled from the archives of
the California Department of Water Resources, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and the
State Water Resources Control Board, that combines the universe of yearly surface water
entitlements and deliveries in California. The third is a geo-spatial dataset that identifies
locations of buying and selling districts, and is used to estimate distances and identify
other parameters related to transaction costs. Full details on each dataset, its cleaning and
processing, is provided in Hagerty (2019, Section 4 and Appendix G).
The combined dataset provides panel data on, amongst others, water deliveries and
transaction prices in California over the 23-year period 1993-2015. The panel data is
unbalanced since districts can be involved in more than one transaction per year. Our unit
of observation is the water district-level. This is the lowest possible level where (a) we can
unambiguously match transactions to units, and (b) we have sufficient information on the
units’ entitlements and deliveries. It turns out that roughly 75% of all transactions in our
transaction dataset can be matched to districts with complete information on entitlements
and deliveries.3
The WestWater transactions database includes a total of 6,309 transactions over the
period 1990–2015. Since we will assess transactions both from the sellers’ and from the
buyers’ perspective, we duplicate each transaction and split the dataset into two, one for
buyers and one for sellers. A minority of transactions involve more than one district on each
side of the transaction. We split up such transactions such that each observation contains
one selling and one buying district. Because of our focus on market power, we choose
to include in our dataset only freely-negotiated transactions of surface water in the spot
market. We therefore drop transactions by excluding (1) transactions whose price is set
administratively (or missing), (2) groundwater transactions, (3) transactions of permanent
water rights, and (4) transactions executed before 1993 (since data on water deliveries is
only available from 1993 onward). Applying these exclusion criteria, we drop 88% of our
observations. We subsequently lose another 28% of our remaining observations (slightly
more for buyers than for sellers) when merging our transactions dataset with our dataset on
districts’ entitlements and deliveries. Our final dataset contains 1,131 observations, 592 for
sellers and 539 for buyers.
Summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and number of observations) on trans-
action for both buyers and sellers are shown in Table 1.1. In addition to transaction volumes
and prices, this table lists statistics on six different factors that were found by Hagerty (2019)
to be costly to buyers or sellers, and thereby generate transaction costs. The first three
are costly to sellers: (S1) transactions that cross the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, (S2)
transactions where the buyer is primarily using water for agricultural purposes, and (S3) the
3The alternative to districts as units of observation would be to either use planning areas or DAU-county areas
(both are hydro-geographical areas defined by the California Department of Water Resources). Doing so would
facilitate the matching with entitlements and deliveries. The downside, however, is that it would severely
reduce the number of observations in our final dataset since transactions would be lumped into fewer units.
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total distance if water is conveyed along a river. The next three are costly to buyers: (B1)
the virtual distance between buyer and seller if water is transferred against the direction
of flow, and (B2) transactions that are subject to a State Water Boards review, and (B3)
transactions that export water from a federal or state water project. Two factors cause
differences in the data between buyers and sellers. One is that, in merging transactions with
entitlements, we lose more observations for buyers than for sellers, and this difference is
apparently not a random draw. The second factor is that the buyer observations include a
substantial share, 24%, where water is acquired for instream use, while for sellers this is
only 1%. Such transactions tend to have much lower prices, roughly half of those where
buyers are purchasing water for consumptive use. We will check whether inclusion of these
transactions affects our results in Section 1.5.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics on transactions by sellers/buyers.
Sellers Buyers
Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs
Price (2010$/AF) 237.49 296.79 592 185.50 173.75 539
Volume (AF) 8.74 24.70 583 8.93 26.67 530
S1: Delta crossing (1=yes) 0.33 0.47 568 . . 0
S2: Agricultural buyer (1=yes) 0.47 0.50 592 . . 0
S3: River distance (km) 0.09 0.10 568 . . 0
B1: Virtual distance (km) . . 0 0.08 0.11 534
B2: State Water Boards review (1=yes) . . 0 0.42 0.49 539
B3: Export from project (1=yes) . . 0 0.05 0.22 539
Transactions mostly occur in a limited number of hydrologic regions. Sellers are mostly
located in the Sacramento River and San Joaquin River regions, while buyers are mostly
located in the Tulare Lake, San Joaquin River, and South Coast regions. We find only few
instances of districts that both sell and buy, suggesting that we can assume fixed roles for
districts as sellers or buyers. Transactions in our database cover a total of 161 districts, which
implies a mean number of 592/161= 3.7 transactions per district over our 23-year period
from the sellers’ perspective and 539/161 = 3.3 for buyers. This low number illustrates that
California’s water market is thin.4
1.4 Empirical strategy
The objective of our empirical exercise is to measure market power in California’s water
market. We do so using the Lerner index (1.8). Calculation of this index requires an estimate
4One could argue that our data suffers from selection bias since we only observe realised transactions and
these are typically from seller-buyer pairs with low transaction costs. Note, however, that we only observe
equilibrium transactions and any non-observed transaction price would be ‘out-of-equilibrium’.
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of WTA′ot (Qot). For the linear model specification introduced in Section 1.2.2, we have
WTA′ot (Qot) = f
′′
ot (Qot) = −δ, which we will estimate using the system of equations (1.7).
Note that this parameter δ is the only estimate that we need to measure market power using
the Lerner index (1.8). To see this, note that our linear model specification with buyer power
allows us to write this index in terms of δ as well as transaction prices and quantities pod t
and qod t , which are present in our transaction data:














Below, we present our empirical strategy to estimate parameter δ.
Given our panel data on transaction prices and quantities, we construct a fixed effects
model, which exploits variation in observed transaction prices, WTA, and WTP across trading
districts and across time. This approach rests on two requirements. The first is that we have
sufficient variation in WTA and WTP over time. In our data, such variation over time is caused
by variation in water entitlements over time, which imply movements along the benefit
function of water use, thereby changing districts’ marginal benefits of water use. Water
entitlements are determined by the interaction of weather fluctuations with historically-
determined allocation rules, which are markedly different across regions of California. The
second requirement is that WTA and WTP are exogenous, conditional on unobserved district
characteristics (as captured by the fixed effects). We meet this requirement by assumption,
since our model dictates that WTA (and, implicitly, WTP) determines transaction prices.
There are two possible sources of endogeneity in our data, one of which is that omitted
variables may cause biases. Ideally, we would control for these using both year fixed effects
as well as time-invariant district-by-counterparty fixed effects. The latter would capture
any variation in prices caused by unobserved heterogeneity across pairs of trading districts.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient observations per trading district-pair to estimate
such fixed effects. We resort to separate seller- and buyer fixed effects instead. The second
possible source of endogeneity is reverse causality, which we discuss at the end of this section.
We substitute the linear specification of our model into the system of equations (1.7):
pod t = −δQot +φo + βt + vot , (1.11a)
pod t = −γQd t −δqod t +ψd + βt + ud t . (1.11b)
An implicit assumption underlying the regression of individual transaction prices on
(some function of) total water use levels is that districts face no uncertainty on their water
entitlements or future prices, which may give them an incentive to hedge the risk of water
shortage within each year. One example would be that districts buy ‘too much’ water and
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will try to re-sell later that same year. We find, however, that only a handful of districts in
our dataset have ever been active on both sides of the market within one year. Hence, this
assumption of no uncertainty seems warranted. It is also consistent with the situation in
many Western US watersheds, where predictions on water availability in early spring provide
‘reasonably accurate forecasts’ of actual availability (Draper, 2001).
Without uncertainty, price differences across transactions for a particular district and
year should not occur, except in the case of transaction costs. In model variations, we therefore
control for various types of transaction costs, as introduced in Section 1.3. Transaction costs
are pair-specific and time-invariant, and they apply to either the seller or the buyer in a
specific transaction, as summarised in Table 1.1. In the regressions below, transaction costs
are included as Todr = τr Codr + τo + τd + εodr , where vector Codr includes seller-, buyer-,
and pair-specific transaction costs, with units (mostly dummies) as presented in Table 1.1,
while τo and τd represent district fixed costs. Since each transaction is assessed twice in this
system, we add r to indicate whether the transaction is assessed from the seller’s perspective
(r = 0) or the buyer’s perspective (r = 1). We expect τr ≥ 0 if r = 0 and τr ≤ 0 if r = 1.
That is, transaction costs enter sellers’ WTA positively, because these have to be compensated
for sellers on top of the sellers’ net benefits, while transaction costs enter the buyers’ WTP
negatively, because these decrease sellers’ net benefits.
We add transaction costs to (1.11), and re-order and re-label terms:
podr t = −δQot + (φo +τo) +τd + βt +τr Codr + (vot + εodr)
= −δQot +φo +ψd + βt +τr Codr + εodr t (1.12a)
podr t = −γQd t −δqod t +τo + (ψd +τd) + βt +τr Codr + (ud t + εodr)
= −γQd t −δqod t +φo +ψd + βt +τr Codr + εodr t (1.12b)
Note that coefficient δ appears in both equations. We estimate both equations simul-
taneously by constructing two variables, Rood tk and R
d
od tk, that combine the coefficients on
water use from (1.12). We also add a counter k, since there can be multiple transactions
between one origin o and one destination d within one year t:
Rood tk =
§
Qot if r = 0
qod tk if r = 1,
and Rdod tk =
§
0 if r = 0
Qd t if r = 1.
The combined regression equation, which also suppresses the intercept, is:
podr tk = −δRood tk − γR
d
od tk +φo +ψd + βt +τr Codr + εodr tk. (1.13)
In the next section, we will estimate variations of (1.13) using linear regression.
Unlike standard models of supply and demand, we are estimating a system with two
demand functions (with slopes given by parameters γ and δ), while the annual supply of
water is determined by rainfall and snow-melt. With hydrological variation between years,
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the total amount of water in the system changes exogenously each year. Summed over
all districts, annual supply cannot respond to changes in price. Despite this exogeneity in
supply, individual districts may still respond to price changes by changing the volume of
water bought or sold. We therefore also estimate (1.13), while instrumenting for water use
with districts’ entitlements, in line with Hagerty (2019).
1.5 Results
The estimates of regression equation (1.13) are shown in Table 1.2. Recall that the aim of
this regression is to estimate the impact of market power on transaction prices via the wedge
WTPd t(Qd t)−WTAot(Qot). Applying a model with quadratic benefit functions implies that
Seller water use (i.e., ROod tk) is one of the independent variables, whose coefficient gives the
slope of the sellers’ benefit function, parameter δ. Multiplied by transaction volume, this
parameter gives the wedge for each transaction.
Table 1.2: Estimating WTA and WTP: Linear model.
Price (2010$/AF) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Seller water use (1,000 AF) −0.0183∗∗ −0.0280∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗ −0.932∗∗
(coefficient −δ) (0.00821) (0.0130) (0.208) (0.445)
Buyer water use (1,000 AF) −0.00757∗∗ −0.0144∗∗ −0.309∗∗ −0.311∗∗
(coefficient −γ) (0.00336) (0.00612) (0.132) (0.156)
Seller fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Buyer fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Year fixed effects Ø
Quadratic time trend Ø Ø Ø
Transaction costs Ø
# Observations 1034 1034 879 877
# Clusters 543 337 308 307
# FE dummies 212 190 164 163
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 9.936 8.681
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using OLS and IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
seller, buyer, and year (but only by seller and buyer in models (2)–(4) where year fixed effects are replaced by
a quadratic time trend).
In model (1), estimated using OLS, we model water use as our only explanatory
variable, combined with seller-, buyer-, role-, and year fixed effects. The coefficient on Seller
water use implies that δ = 0.0183, which is more than double the size of γ = 0.00757,
implied by the coefficient on Buyer water use. The difference indicates that selling districts
have steeper demand curves than buying districts. In model (2) we attempt to improve
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efficiency of these estimates. Given the large number of clusters compared to observations,
we replace year fixed effects by a time trend. No comparable simplification was found
feasible for the other fixed effects. Particularly, there is no obvious possibility to replace
seller- and buyer fixed effects with a coarser set of dummy variables. As a result of replacing
the year fixed effect by the time trend, the number of clusters decreases sharply. Compared
to model (1), the model (2) estimates for both δ and γ increase significantly. In model (3),
we instrument water use by districts’ water entitlements. The resulting estimations of δ
and γ increase sharply, in absolute terms, compared to those of models (2) and (3). Finally,
in model (4), we add seller- and buyer-specific transaction costs, which do not appear to
improve the model results, decreasing the F-statistic and increasing the standard error of
our main coefficient of interest. The Cragg-Donald F-statistics for the first stages of the IV
models (not presented here) are both higher than their critical values, as reported by Stock
and Yogo (2005), suggesting that models (3) and (4) do not suffer from weak instruments.
Based on these model results and interpretation, our preferred model is model (3) and
we use the main coefficient of interest from this specification, δ = 0.580, in the remainder
of this section. The interpretation of δ is that sellers’ WTA, which equals the water price in
our model, increases by $0.58/AF for each 1,000 AF sold.5 More important for our analysis,
however, is that δ is used to calculate the wedge WTPd t(Qd t)−WTAot(Qot) = δqod . Doing
so we find that the average wedge, after removing one outlier, equals $4.60/AF (SD=8.66).
This wedge corresponds to about 6.4% of the transaction price, on average, with markedly
higher wedges (both in absolute and relative terms) for transactions with low prices. We
use transaction-specific wedges to compute the Lerner index of (1.10) and plot these in
Figure 1.2. This figure shows that the Lerner index is relatively low. It is markedly higher,
though, for a small set of transactions with low prices, which also tend to have the highest
transaction volumes. All in all, we find that market power is relatively low in Californias’
water market.
1.6 A conjectural variations approach
We proceed to compare our results to those obtained using a conjectural variations approach
in order to verify whether our assumption of buyer power is warranted. In this approach, the
term expressing market power is multiplied by some weight that dampens this term. A recent
example that employs this approach and analyses Californian groundwater is Bruno and
Sexton (2020). Accordingly, we introduce conjectural variations using parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]
that measures the degree of buyer power, while ξ ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of seller
power. Allowing for both buyer- and seller power, we rewrite (1.7) to include these market
5AF: acre-foot. One acre-foot equals 1,233 m3.
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Figure 1.2: Transaction prices and the Lerner index.





Lerner index: WTPd t (Qd t )−WTAot (Qot )WTAot (Qot ) = δ̂ ·
qod t
pod t
Scatter-plot of transaction prices and the Lerner index as given by (1.10) (one outlier
removed).
power weights:
pod t =WTAot (Qot)− ξ · qod t ·WTP′d t (Qd t) , (1.14a)
pod t =WTPd t (Qd t) + θ · qod t ·WTA′ot (Qot) . (1.14b)
The new terms capture districts’ expectations about other districts’ reactions to a change in
transaction quantities. These expectations are convex combinations of expected reactions
under perfect competition vs. settings with buyer or seller power. As a result, the maximum
possible markups or markdowns are dampened by, respectively, θ or ξ. In our analysis so
far we have assumed (θ ,ξ) = (1,0), i.e., only buyer power. Two other special cases of the
model are seller power – which would imply (θ ,ξ) = (0, 1) – and perfect competition, which
would imply (θ ,ξ) = (0, 0).
We proceed to estimate this system of equations. The resulting values of θ and ξ will
verify whether our assumption of buyer power is warranted using this conjectural variations
approach. Taking similar steps as before, we first substitute the linear model specification:
podr t = α−δQot + γqod tk − (1− ξ)γqod t
+φo +ψd + βt +τr Codr + εodr t , (1.15a)
podr t = a−δqod t − γQd t + (1− θ )δqod tk
+φo +ψd + βt +τr Codr + εodr t . (1.15b)
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The combined regression equation becomes:






od tk+φo+ψd+βt+τr Codr+εodr tk (1.16)




od tk and R̂
d
od tk are defined as follows:
R̃dod tk =
§
−qod tk if r = 0
Qd t if r = 1,
, R̂ood tk =
§
0 if r = 0
qod tk if r = 1,
, R̂dod tk =
§
qod tk if r = 0
0 if r = 1.
In order to get a clear view on the parameters of interest, we apply extremum estimation
of the IV criterion function, transformed such that we optimise our parameters δ, γ, θ and ξ.
Table 1.3 reports the results for the case where no restrictions were imposed on the parameters
in the IV criterion function. We present three models. In model (1) we allow only buyer
power, in model (2) only seller power, while model (3) allows for both. In addition to the
coefficients on seller and buyer water use, −δ and −γ, we report coefficients on both market
power weights, θ and ξ, while suppressing the coefficients on the terms R̂ood tk and R̂
d
od tk,
since these coefficients are combinations of the four parameters that are already reported.
The unrestricted estimates for seller and buyer power weight, ξ and θ , are found to
lie outside the bounds [0,1]. All three models find estimates for −δ and −γ that are very
close to those obtained in our preferred model (3) of Table 1.2. Looking at the estimated
coefficients for ξ and θ , we find that the seller power weight ξ is negative in model (2)
while it is not significantly different from zero in model (3). The buyer power weight θ has
the correct sign, though the present estimates seems to be larger than 1, both in model (1)
and (3). These results point to absence of seller power while they support buyer power.
Imposing the restrictions that ξ ∈ [0,1] and θ ∈ [0,1] leads to the expected result
estimates at the boundaries of these intervals. Given that the amount of observations in the
dataset is relatively low compared to the number of parameters and fixed effects, and hence
both estimates and standard deviations cannot be extracted with too great precision, we
take these results as an indication that buyer power is the most reasonable assumption.
1.7 Robustness
In this section, we report on five robustness checks. First, we check robustness when we focus
on relevant sub-samples of the data. Second, we apply an alternative model specification
featuring non-linear benefit functions. Third, we alter the calculation of districts’ water use
to account for timing of transactions within one year. Fourth, we check whether selling and
buying districts can be reasonably assumed to have similar benefit functions. Finally, despite
the results of our conjectural variations approach, we estimate a model with seller power.
Note that this list of robustness checks is not exhaustive. Importantly, we also checked
for differential levels of market power. One such example would be differential market
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Table 1.3: Estimating WTA and WTP: Conjectural variations.









Seller total water use (1,000 AF) −0.577∗∗∗ −0.610∗∗∗ −0.573∗∗∗
(coefficient −δ) (0.162) (0.180) (0.162)
Buyer total water use (1,000 AF) −0.242∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(coefficient −γ) (0.070) (0.082) (0.070)
Seller power weight −8.581∗∗ 1.251
(coefficient ξ) (3.570) (2.422)
Buyer power weight 5.664∗∗∗ 6.155∗∗∗
(coefficient θ) (0.658) (1.237)
Seller fixed effects Ø Ø Ø
Buyer fixed effects Ø Ø Ø
Year fixed effects
Quadratic time trend Ø Ø Ø
Transaction costs
# Observations 879 879 879
# FE dummies 164 164 164
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using extremum estimation. The covariance matrix is computed
as a robust sandwich covariance matrix, following the theory of extremum estimation (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005, Section 6.3.4). Standard errors in parentheses. Models (1)–(3) correspond to model (3) of Table 1.2,
but using the conjectural variations approach.
power occurs in wet versus dry years. In wet years, one could imagine that buyers have
better opportunities to exercise market power. Using the Sacramento Valley Water Year
Hydrological Classification Index to classify years, we fail to find such differences. Another
option is differential market power depending on the location of buyers and sellers. The
argument would be that buyers that are more central would have more opportunities to
switch to another seller and could therefore achieve higher markdowns. This argument
ignores, however, that the Californian water market features an almost complete hydrological
network enabling water transfers between nearly any two districts. As a result, while central
buyers would probably face lower transaction costs, they do not have increased opportunities
to exercise market power compared to buyers at the periphery.
1.7.1 Sub-sample analysis
We repeat our preferred model (3) of Table 1.2 for three sub-samples of interest. Table 1.4
shows the results of these additional regressions. For reference, we include the preferred
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model as model (1). In model (2), we drop all observations that involve water for envir-
onmental use, for instance buy-backs by the government. Arguably, such transactions are
markedly different from transactions between districts that intend to use the water for con-
sumptive purposes. In model (3), we include only transactions where agricultural districts
are selling, which seem to represent the smaller, weaker actors in the market. Unfortunately,
our sample size does not allow us to focus only on water sales from agricultural to urban
districts (slightly more than 100 transactions), which seem to represent the larger, stronger
actors capable of exercising market power (see e.g., Isaaks and Colby, 2020). By focusing on
all sales from agricultural districts, we may still capture the fact that agricultural districts
may have less market power than the other types of districts. Note that half of these sales are
to other agricultural districts, while the other half is shared roughly equally between buying
urban districts and environmental projects. In model (4), we drop outlier transactions. We
exclude the 5% transactions with lowest and 5% transactions with highest transaction prices,
and similarly for transaction volumes.
Table 1.4: Estimating WTA and WTP: Sub-samples









Seller water use (1,000 AF) −0.580∗∗∗ −0.520∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗
(coefficient −δ) (0.208) (0.201) (0.179) (0.142)
Buyer water use (1,000 AF) −0.309∗∗ −0.278∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗
(coefficient −γ) (0.132) (0.127) (0.108) (0.0906)
Seller fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Buyer fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Quadratic time trend Ø Ø Ø Ø
# Observations 879 728 778 737
# Clusters 308 248 261 250
# FE dummies 164 149 133 132
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 9.936 7.057 14.01 10.82
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller and
buyer. Model (1) corresponds to our preferred model (3) of Table 1.2. In model (2), we drop transactions
from or to environmental use. In model (3), we keep only transactions where agricultural districts are selling.
In model (4), we drop transactions that are outliers in terms of price or volume.
Coefficients of sub-sample Models (2)–(4) are not statistically different from those of
the preferred model. Model (2), which discards 17% of the observations, performs similarly
in terms of precision and slightly worse in terms of the F-statistic. Unexpectedly, Model (3)
does not show a higher coefficient (in absolute terms). Hence, there is no indication of more
buyer power when buying from an agricultural district. Model (4) suggests that some of the
market power we find is driven by outlier transactions in terms of price or volume, as one
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could expect. Combined, these additional regressions show that our main results are robust
to including only specific sub-samples of interest.
1.7.2 Constant price elasticity
In the main specification of our model, we have imposed a constant slope of the benefit
functions and a variable price elasticity. In this section, we impose instead that these functions
have a constant price elasticity and, consequently, a variable slope. In particular, we consider
the class of non-linear WTA functions that are homogeneous6. Given our earlier assumption
of differentiability, we have that Euler’s Homogeneous Function Theorem7 applies to the
equilibrium conditions and Lerner index.
For arbitrary homogeneous WTAot (Qot) of order −κo, we can rewrite the wedge
WTPd t(Qd t)−WTAot(Qot) as










· [κo ·WTAot (Qot)] . (1.17)
This implies that the Lerner index of (1.8) can be updated to






The empirical strategy to estimate κo has many similarities to the empirical strategy proposed
in Section 1.4, and we refer to Appendix 1.9 for details. The resulting regression equation
becomes:




odr tk +φo +ψd + βt + lnτr Codr + εodr tk, (1.19)
where R
o
od tk and R
d
od tk are modifications of R
o
od tk, respectively, R
d
od tk that are defined in
Appendix 1.9.
We estimate variations of (1.19) using linear regression, similar to Table 1.2 for our
main model specification. Table 1.5 shows the estimates of four models that are similar to
models (1)–(4) of Table 1.2. Despite allowing for non-linear benefit functions, the models
of Table 1.5 do not perform better than those of our linear model specification in Table 1.2
in terms of the Cragg-Donald F-statistic, nor the precision of our coefficient of interest, the
coefficient on Seller water use.
Again, we use model (3) to derive the main coefficient of interest for this model
specification, κo = 0.370. Similar as before, we use this coefficient to calculate the wedge
6The function f : R→ R is homogeneous of order κ ∈ R if f (µx) = µk f (x), for all x and µ > 0.
7Let the function f : R→ R be homogeneous of order κ ∈ R. Euler’s Homogeneous Function Theorem states
that x · f ′ (x)=κ · f (x).
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Table 1.5: Estimating WTA and WTP: Constant price elasticity.
Log price (2010$/AF) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Log (seller water use, 1,000 AF) −0.0000147 −0.000660 −0.370∗∗ −0.623∗
(coefficient −κo) (0.000224) (0.000670) (0.173) (0.357)
Log (buyer water use, 1,000 AF) −0.000576 −0.00185∗ −0.402∗∗ −0.458
(coefficient −κd) (0.000568) (0.00106) (0.194) (0.279)
Seller fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Buyer fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Year fixed effects Ø
Quadratic time trend Ø Ø Ø
Transaction costs Ø
# Observations 942 942 827 825
# Clusters 465 292 274 273
# FE dummies 188 166 148 147
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 7.808 5.954
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using OLS and IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered
by seller and buyer, and year (but only by seller and buyer in models (2)–(4), where year fixed effects are
replaced by a quadratic time trend). Models (1)–(4) correspond to models (1)–(4) of Table 1.2, but now with
a non-linear model specification.
WTPd t (Qd t)−WTAot (Qot) =
qod t
Qot




We find that the mean value of this ratio is heavily skewed by 15 districts that sell the
majority of their entitlements at least once. After removing these outlier observations, we
have qod tQot = 0.10 and the corresponding average wedge equals $ 6.97/AF (SD=14.05), which
is about 50% larger than the wedge found for the linear model specification, but still small
in percentage terms.
Note that we do not attach much weight to the results from this specification, both
because of its sensitivity to removing outliers, and also since the functional form of regression
equation (1.19) depends on the specific implementation of a first-order Taylor expansion
(see Appendix 1.9 for details), which may not be warranted. With these caveats in mind,
the results of a model specification with constant price elasticity are largely consistent with
those from the linear model specification.
1.7.3 Transaction timing
So far we have ignored information on the timing of transactions. As a result, in case of
multiple transactions per district per year, each district’s water use—as captured by variables
Riod tk, i = o, d, in (1.13)—is identical for each of these transactions within one year. This
approach is consistent with the assumption of no uncertainty with respect to districts’ water
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entitlements, such that districts can foresee how much water they are going to sell or buy
within a year. In this section, we take the alternative approach and update Qd t and Qot
after each transaction. This implies that we use counter k to calculate water use (just) after
transaction j = 1, 2, . . . as Qot j = eot −
∑ j
k=1 qod( j)tk and Qd t j = ed t +
∑ j
k=1 qo( j)d tk, where d( j)
is the jth counterparty of o and o( j) is the jth counterparty of d. When multiple transactions
happen to occur within the same month, we order them by transaction volume such that
smaller transactions go first. In an alternative specification, we reverse this order.
Table 1.6 shows the results. For reference, we include the preferred model from
Table 1.6: Estimating WTA and WTP: Dynamic updating







Seller water use (1,000 AF) −0.580∗∗∗ −0.530∗∗∗ −0.551∗∗∗
(coefficient −δ) (0.208) (0.186) (0.195)
Buyer water use (1,000 AF) −0.309∗∗ −0.306∗∗ −0.305∗∗
(coefficient −γ) (0.132) (0.127) (0.128)
Seller fixed effects Ø Ø Ø
Buyer fixed effects Ø Ø Ø
Quadratic time trend Ø Ø Ø
# Observations 879 879 879
# Clusters 308 308 308
# FE dummies 164 164 164
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 9.936 11.15 10.58
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by seller and
buyer. Model (1) corresponds to our preferred model (3) of Table 1.2. In models (2) and (3), water use is
updated dynamically in case of multiple transactions per district per year. In model (2), multiple transactions
in one month are ordered from small to large volume, in model (3) this is reversed.
Table 1.2 as model (1). In models (2) and (3), we repeat this model using our dynamically
updating measure of water use. The results shows that the effect of transaction timing on
prices is negligible.
1.7.4 Sellers and buyers on one demand curve
So far we have estimated buyers’ and sellers’ demand curves separately rather than estimating
a combined curve. We reject this possibility with multiple arguments. First, we test for
equivalence of coefficients using our preferred model (3) of Table 1.2. Based on a Wald
test (F(1,356)=4.92, p = 0.027), we reject equality of these coefficients. Second, we use
theory and data to argue that selling and buying water districts differ in key characteristics,
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implying that buying districts cannot be on the same demand curve as selling districts, and
hence our approach of modelling two distinct curves is correct.
Table 1.7 compares selling and buying districts in terms of their main type of water
use (urban, agriculture, environment), levels of water entitlements and water use as well as
whether or not a district trades with more than one counterparty in any given year. Clearly,
Table 1.7: Key differences between sellers/buyers.
Sellers Buyers
Mean SD Mean SD
District: urban (share) 0.08 0.28 0.29 0.45
District: agriculture (share) 0.91 0.29 0.47 0.50
District: environment (share) 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.43
Water entitlements (1,000 AF) 193.72 298.63 207.97 570.51
Total water use (1,000 AF) 176.22 280.61 251.65 578.29
More than one counterparty (yes=1) 0.36 0.48 0.55 0.50
selling and buying districts differ in their types of water use. Sellers are more likely to use
water for agriculture, while buyers are more likely to use water for urban or environmental
uses. The key variable that underlines our argument that sellers and buyers are on different
demand curves for water is Water entitlements. Table 1.7 shows that buying districts have
higher water entitlements than selling districts, and by purchasing water they end up with
even higher levels of water use compared with selling districts. If selling and buying districts
would have identical demand curves for water, then districts with higher water use would
be selling water, rather than buying. In Figure 1.1, this implies that ed would be located to
the right of the competitive Qd . This location implies that WTPd(Qd)<WTAo(Qo), which is
inconsistent with the occurrence of observed water transactions. It follows that sellers and
buyers are not on one demand curve.
A final difference between selling and buying districts is related to the dummy variable
that measures whether a district has More than one counterparty. Comparison indicates
that buyers have 53% more transactions with multiple counter-parties than sellers do. This
statistic points to buyer power, with sellers being on the long side of the market.
1.7.5 Seller power
Our main result is that buyer power is relatively low. Going against previous literature,
stakeholder beliefs, and the results of our conjectural variations approach of Section 1.6, we
now reverse our model to estimate seller power. This allows us to check if rather counter-
intuitively, a model with seller power would better explain our data than our model with
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buyer power. We start by adapting (1.7) as follows:
pod =WTAo (Qo)− qod ·WTP′ (Qd) , (1.20a)
pod =WTPd (Qd) . (1.20b)
Taking similar steps as in Section 1.4, the resulting regression equation becomes:
podr tk = −δR̃ood tk − γR̃
d
od tk +τr Codr +φo +ψd + βt + εodr tk, (1.21)
where R̃ood tk and R̃
d
od tk are modifications of R
o
od tk, respectively, R
d




Qot if r = 0




−qod tk if r = 0
Qd t if r = 1.
Table 1.8: Estimating WTA and WTP: Seller power.
Price (2010$/AF) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Seller water use (1,000 AF) −0.0162∗∗ −0.0251∗∗ −0.576∗∗∗ −0.867∗∗
(coefficient −δ) (0.00786) (0.0126) (0.212) (0.435)
Buyer water use (1,000 AF) −0.00764∗∗ −0.0145∗∗ −0.329∗∗ −0.324∗∗
(coefficient −γ) (0.00341) (0.00620) (0.147) (0.159)
Seller fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Buyer fixed effects Ø Ø Ø Ø
Year fixed effects Ø
Quadratic time trend Ø Ø Ø
Transaction costs Ø
# Observations 1034 1034 879 877
# Clusters 543 337 308 307
# FE dummies 212 190 164 163
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 8.507 8.231
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects models using OLS and IV. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
seller, buyer, and year (but only by seller and buyer in models (2)–(4), where year fixed effects are replaced by
a quadratic time trend). Models (1)–(4) correspond to models (1)–(4) of Table 1.2, but now with seller power.
Results of this regression are displayed in Table 1.8. The resulting coefficients are very
similar to those of models (1)–(4) of our main specification with buyer power in Table 1.2.
Importantly, with seller power our measure of market power is now based on the coefficient on
Buyer water use, i.e., γ rather than δ. Restricting the comparison to our preferred model (3),
we find that model (3) of Table 1.8 does not perform better than model (3) of Table 1.2
when comparing either the Cragg-Donald F-statistic, or the precision of our coefficient of
interest. In case one would still assume seller power, we obtain from model (3) of Table 1.8
that γ= 0.329, which is lower than δ = 0.580 from model (3) of Table 1.2. This difference
would imply Lerner indices to be about 50% lower under seller power than under buyer
power.
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1.8 Conclusions
Using a Nash-Cournot model, we derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market
power in a typical water market setting and we construct related Lerner indices. Applying
our model to surface water transactions in California over the period 1993-2015, we find
only limited market power in California’s water market, despite the thinness of this market.
Our main specification implies that buyer power yields an average mark-down of 6% of the
transaction price. This result is important in the context of current discussions on Californian
water market reform (see e.g., Maples et al., 2018) which, perhaps, should focus on other
distorting factors, most notably transaction costs (Carey et al., 2002; Regnacq et al., 2016;
Hagerty, 2019; Leonard et al., 2019).
Our model has three main assets: (1) it features a closed-form solution, (2) it does not
rely on conjectural variations, and (3) it is sufficiently flexible that it can be applied to other
types of endowment economies, including permit markets. On the downside, our model
requires choosing a specific functional form for WTP and WTA that may not be warranted.
In addition, while our current application is quite clear in terms of the side of the market
where market power resides, this may not be the case in other applications.
One explanation for the limited extent of market power in California is that transaction
quantities are, generally, small. These quantities enter our Lerner index linearly such that
small quantities imply low mark-downs. By the same line of reasoning, high prices also imply
low mark-downs. This effect was illustrated clearly in Figure 1.2. Another explanation for
the limited extent of market power is that, although California’s water market is ‘thin’ in
trades, it is ‘thick’ in possibilities to trade. Recall from Section 1.7 that California features an
almost complete hydrological network such that nearly any two districts can trade water.
The fact that many do not trade does not imply that such trades are not feasible. Rather, it
implies that such districts have high pair-specific transaction costs, which causes a relatively
low WTP or a relatively high WTA. The threat of a counterparty switching to a competing
district limits the possibility to exercise market power (Funaki et al., 2020). The extent to
which such threats affect equilibrium outcomes is an avenue for future research.
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1.9 Appendix
Solution for the symmetric model
In this appendix, we provide a solution to this main specification of our model in terms of
quantities and prices, assuming αot = α for all o and ad t = a for all d to keep the analysis
simple. We maintain condition (1.9) which, suppressing time subscripts, can now be written
as a− γed > α−δeo.
For each individual buyer, we can write the maximand of equation (1.4), i.e., the











































Applying (1.5), we take the derivative of the buyer’s profit function (1.22) with respect to
qod and, by symmetry, simplify the resulting condition by writing qod = q:
a− γ(ed + Noq)−α+δ(eo − Ndq)−δq = 0, (1.23)
This condition implies a− γed −α+ δeo = [Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ]q > 0. Thus, the equilibrium
quantity from seller to buyer qod equals
q∗ = q∗od =
a− γed −α+δeo
Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
, (1.24)
which is positive for all o and d by (1.9).
In case the number of available buyers Nd and/or the number of available sellers No
increases, then each buyer would buy less water from each individual seller. The quantity
in equilibrium can be expressed differently by substituting S = α− δeo and B = a − γed .
Thus, q∗ = (B − S)/(Noγ + (Nd + 1)δ). The numerator of this expression consists of the
marginal benefits of water use at the initial entitlements. If the buyers’ marginal benefit B
increases, trade will increase. In contrast, if the sellers’ marginal benefit S increases, trade
will decrease. The effects on trade of parameters a, α, γ, δ and initial entitlements ed and eo
follow immediately through their effects on either B or S. For example, an increase in the
initial entitlement ed of individual buyers implies that individual buyers buy less. Similarly,
an increase of the initial entitlement eo of individual sellers implies that individual sellers
sell more.
23
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
Françeska Tomori
Chapter 1. Market power in California’s water market
We use equilibrium quantities as in (1.24) to derive the sellers’ and buyers’ equilib-
rium (marginal) benefits as well as prices. Using (1.2), we have that WTP(Qd) = a− γQd
and WTA(Qo) = α − δQo. By symmetry, we can therefore write the marginal benefit for,
respectively, each buyer and each seller in equilibrium:







(Nd + 1)δB + NoγS
Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
, (1.25a)




Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
. (1.25b)
From the WTP function, we directly obtain Qd = (a−WTP(Qd))/γ. The other component
of benefit function fd is (a −
1




= 12 (a+ a− γQd) =
1
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Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
2
. (1.26b)
Given buyer power, equilibrium price equals the marginal willingness to accept. Us-
ing (1.25b), we have
p∗ =WTA(Q∗o) =
(Noγ+δ)S + NdδB
Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
. (1.27)
This completes the derivation of the symmetric version of the main specification of our
model.
For completeness, we also verify that equation (1.6) holds. This equation states that
the difference between WTP and WTA equals −qodWTA′o (Qo) = δq
∗
od > 0. Substitution of




(Nd + 1)δB + NoγS
Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
−
(Noγ+δ)S + NdδB
Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
= δ
B − S
Noγ+ (Nd + 1)δ
= δq∗od . (1.28)
Therefore, equation (1.6) holds, as it should.
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Main specification with asymmetry
In this appendix, we generalise the linear model specification introduced in Section 1.2.2 to
allow for asymmetry in terms of benefit parameters γ and δ.
Consider a setting where all buyers are asymmetric, all sellers are asymmetric and
buyers are on the short side of the market. We update our benefit functions to allow for
asymmetry in terms of benefit parameters γ and δ, while suppressing time subscripts to keep
notation simple. For each destination we now have fd(Qd) =Qd(ad −
1
2γdQd), and for each




d(Qd) = ad − γdQd , which is the
WTP in (1.1), while f ′o (Qo) = αo −δoQo, which is the WTA in (1.2). We number sellers as
o = 1,2,3, . . . and buyers as d = −1,−2,−3 . . .. Subscript od = 2− 1 implies that seller 2
delivers to buyer 1.
Three simplified settings are representative for almost all transactions that occur in the
data, as introduced in Section 1.3: (a) 1 seller–1 buyer, (b) 1 seller–y buyers with y ≥ 2,
and (c) x sellers–1 buyer with x ≥ 2. Transaction networks with x sellers and y buyers
pertain to only 3% of transactions in our database, illustrating again that California’s water
market is thin.
Consider setting (a) of a single seller and a single buyer who only trade with each other
and non-traders in the background as potential alternative trading partners. The simplest
situation consists of one non-trader on each side of the market. If we number seller 1 and
buyer −1 as the trading parties with q1−1 > 0, then seller 2 and buyer −2 do not trade,
i.e., q1−2 = q2−1 = q2−2 = 0. The equilibrium conditions are derived from buyer −1 who
maximises over quantities q1−1 and q2−1 and from buyer −2 who maximises over quantities
q1−2 and q2−2. After adding subscripts d and o, we take the derivative of the buyer’s profit
function (1.22) with respect to qod and obtain:
ad − γd(ed + q1d + q2d)−αo +δo(eo − qo−1 − qo−2) +δoqod ≤ 0. (1.29)
For o = 1, 2 and d = −1,−2, we have q1−1 > 0 and q1−2 = q2−1 = q2−2 = 0, so we obtain four
equilibrium conditions:
a−1 − γ−1(e−1 + q1−1)−α1 +δ1(e1 − q1−1) +δ1 · q1−1 = 0, (1.30a)
a−1 − γ−1(e−1 + q1−1)−α2 +δ2e2 ≤ 0, (1.30b)
a−2 − γ−2e−2 −α1 +δ1(e1 − q1−1) ≤ 0, (1.30c)
a−2 − γ−2e−2 −α2 +δ2e2 ≤ 0. (1.30d)
Before solving, we combine and rewrite these four equilibrium conditions in terms of equilib-
rium WTP or WTA. In doing so, note that because q1−1 ≥ 0, we can rewrite the first condition
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as a weak inequality: a−1 − γ−1(e−1 + q1−1)−α1 +δ1(e1 − q1−1) = −δ1q1−1 ≤ 0. We obtain
α1 −δ1(e1 − q1−1)≥max{a−1 − γ−1(e−1 + q1−1), a−2 − γ−2e−2},
α2 −δ2e2 ≥max{a−1 − γ−1(e−1 + q1−1), a−2 − γ−2e−2},
a−1 − γ−1(e−1 + q1−1)≤min{α1 −δ1(e1 − q1−1),α2 −δ2e2},
a−2 − γ−2e−2 ≤min{α1 −δ1(e1 − q1−1),α2 −δ2e2}.
The first two conditions indicate that, in equilibrium, the seller’s WTA must be equal
to or larger than the highest WTP for all buyers in the market, independent whether these
sellers trade or not. The last two lines indicate that, in equilibrium, the buyers’ WTP must be
equal to or lower than the highest WTA from sellers in the market, independent whether
these buyers trade or not. These insights generalise to any market with No sellers and Nd
buyers, independent whether these trade or not. These conditions imply that none of the
buyer-seller pairs has incentives to expand equilibrium trade.
We now check each of the equilibrium conditions in (1.30). Solving condition (1.30a)
gives equilibrium trade between seller o = 1 and buyer d = −1. We obtain
q∗1−1 =
a−1 − γ−1e−1 −α1 +δ1e1
γ−1
. (1.31)
Under a−1−γ−1e−1 > α1−δ1e1, which is a straightforward modification of (1.9), this quantity
is positive. Substitution of q∗1−1 into condition (1.30b) yields α1−δ1e1 ≤ α2−δ2e2. Evaluated
at the initial entitlements, seller 1’s WTA is lower than that of seller 2, making seller 1 more
efficient in supplying water. Rewriting after substitution of q∗1−1 into condition (1.30c) yields









(a−1 − γ−1e−1). (1.32)
For δ1γ−1 ∈ [0,1], the right-hand side is the convex combination of seller 1’s WTA and buyer
1’s WTP, both evaluated at the initial entitlements. For the boundary case δ1 = γ−1, the
right-hand side simplifies to a−1 − γ−1e−1. Evaluated at the initial entitlements, buyer −1’s
WTP is higher than that of buyer −2, making buyer −1 more efficient in purchasing water. If
the gap in WTP between the two buyers is positive, then condition (1.32) also holds for δ1
almost equal to γ−1. Finally, condition (1.30d) specifies the condition that non-trading seller
o = 2 and non-trading buyer d = −2 do not want to trade with each other. If rewritten as
a−2 − γ−2e−2 ≤ α2 −δ2e2, it is the complement of modified condition (1.9).
To summarise, the configuration in which seller 1 exclusively trades with buyer −1
arises naturally in case seller 1 has a substantially lower WTA than competing seller 2,
while buyer −1 has a substantially larger WTP than competing buyer −2. By the preceding
discussion of the equilibrium conditions in (1.30), a sufficient condition for water trade
between seller 1 and buyer −1 is the following:
α2 −δ2e2 > a−1 − γ−1e−1 > α1 −δ1e1 > a−2 − γ−2e−2. (1.33)
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Equilibrium (marginal) benefits and prices for the asymmetric case can be determined
similarly to the symmetric case as was done in Appendix–1.9.
Cases (b) and (c) can be analysed in a similar way when trading buyers are symmetric
and trading sellers are symmetric. This involves a lot of repetition of case (a) without
generating new insights. Asymmetry within the groups of trading buyers and sellers can also
be included. This requires solving a linear system of equations in order to obtain the unique
equilibrium quantities, which is cumbersome for the general case of x asymmetric sellers
and y asymmetric buyers.
Non-linear demand
In this appendix, we present our empirical strategy for the model of Section 1.7.2 featuring
a non-linear WTA function that is homogeneous. Our aim is to estimate κo, so that we can
measure the Lerner index for this model specification.
The strategy is largely similar to that of Section 1.4 for the linear model specification.
We start with the following system of regression equations, based on (1.7), and substitute
(1.17) to obtain
pod = WTA (Qo) , (1.34a)
pod = WTP (Qd)− κo ·
qod
Qo
·WTA (Qo) . (1.34b)
Substituting pod for WTAo(Qo), we solve the last equation for pod , which yields the non-linear
system








WTPd (Qd) . (1.35b)
This system can be written in logarithmic form as
ln pod = ln WTA (Qo) , (1.36a)








To extract parameter κ out of the last term, we approximate it by the first-order Taylor
expansion of the logarithmic function around 1.8 This yields the following non-linear system:
ln pod = ln WTA (Qo) , (1.37a)




8The first-order Taylor expansion of ln(1+ x) around x0 = 0 is given by ln(1+ x0) +
1
1+x0
(x − x0) = x . In our
case x = qodQo ·κ.
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We proceed to estimate (1.37) for the specification Ai (Q i)
−κi , i = o, d and κi > 0,
that features constant price elasticity equal to −1/κi. Substitution, rewriting and including
multiplicative transaction costs in the factor Ai, i = o, d as well as seller-, buyer-, and year
fixed effects, yields
ln podr tk = −κo lnQot + lnτr Codr +φo +ψd + βt + εodr tk, (1.38a)
ln podr tk = −κo
qod tk
Qot
− κd lnQd t + lnτr Codr +φo +ψd + βt + εodr tk. (1.38b)
Similar to the procedure used in deriving the regression equation for our linear model
specification, we combine both equations. This combination requires the construction of two





lnQot if r = 0





0 if r = 0
lnQd t if r = 1.
The combined regression equation is:




odr tk + lnτr Codr +φo +ψd + βt + εod tk. (1.39)
Results of the estimation of this regression equation are presented in Table 1.5 and discussed
in Section 1.7.2.
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Chapter 2
The impact of environmental regulatory capture on
innovation and emissions: The case of the
automobile industry
Overview. In the light of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, a common belief that
has formed is that regulatory capture in the control and setting of emission standards has
led to lower pollution abatement and less environmental innovation in gasoline and diesel
combustion engines. This chapter analyses whether this indeed is the case. Our results
indicate that regulatory capture only leads to more emissions and less innovation effort
under a multi-product monopoly, while the opposite is true under oligopoly competition.
These different results are due to a competition intensifying effect which is only present with
at least two firms in the market. This effect results from the fact that a consumer-orientated
regulator sets higher emission standards for diesel cars, which leads to higher output and
more intensive competition among car producers. Consequently, because emission standards
and environmental innovation are strategic substitutes, car producers reduce their innovation
effort. The result means that the common belief that regulatory capture in the control and
setting of environmental standards necessarily leads to more emissions and less environ-
mental innovation is false.
JEL classification: Q52; Q55; Q58; L51.
Keywords: Environmental regulation, Emission standards, Innovation, Abatement technology, Regu-
latory capture, Automobile industry.
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2.1 Introduction
Environmental concerns about diesel cars have intensified since the Volkswagen emissions
scandal in 2015, when the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered
that Volkswagen used a specific technology in its diesel motor cars to reduce emissions during
the testing period. A major consequence of the Volkswagen emissions scandal was that it
raised awareness among the population that diesel car producers, in general, have polluted
more than they were allowed. Moreover, the scandal contributed to the suspicion that the
control of emission standards by regulatory authorities has been rather lax.1 Therefore,
a common belief that has formed is that regulatory capture in the control and setting of
environmental standards has led to more emissions and less environmental innovation. The
objective of this chapter is to analyse whether and under which circumstances this is indeed
the case.
Our results indicate that regulatory capture only leads to higher emissions and less
innovation effort under a multi-product monopoly or under cartel formation in the automobile
industry, while the opposite is true under oligopoly competition with at least two firms. The
intuition for these results hinges on two effects of emission standard regulation: a production
cost effect and a competition intensifying effect. The production cost effect means that a producer-
orientated regulator will abate less pollution to save on environmental innovation costs.
The competition intensifying effect occurs because a consumer-orientated regulator increases
the competition between car manufactures by facilitating the production of diesel cars by
allowing more emissions for this type of car. Gasoline car producers respond to this with a
price reduction, thereby compensating for their loss of market share by gaining consumers
who would otherwise not buy a car. This means that consumers obtain higher surplus as
they can buy more cars and at lower prices. The resulting higher total emissions under
a consumer-orientated regulator disincentivises environmental innovation effort because
emission standards and innovation efforts are strategic substitutes. Since under multi-product
monopoly only the production cost effect is present, we obtain that regulatory capture yields
more emissions and less environmental innovation. In contrast, under oligopoly competition,
the competition intensifying effect dominates over the production cost effect, meaning that
regulatory capture leads to less total emissions and more innovation. This result remains
valid when the regulator is initially captured only by the gasoline car manufacturer and
when the environmental damages of one type of car are (considered) more harmful.
While the impact of regulatory capture has not yet been analysed in the context of
environmental regulation and innovation, our analytical framework borrows from three
different literatures. First, it relates to the literature that compares the impact of different
environmental regulation instruments on innovation effort. Montero (2002) uses a model
in which firms compete à la Cournot and compares firms’ R&D incentives in a two-stage
1See an article in Carrington (2015) for details on this.
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game under four environmental policy instruments: two command-and-control instruments
(emission and performance standards) and two market-based instruments (tradable permits
and auction permits). The results indicate that the command-and-control instruments provide
greater incentives for innovation than the market-based instruments. Amir et al. (2018,
2019) compare performance and emission standards in terms of total welfare and find that
the former are generally preferable to the latter. Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2016) analyse
how a regulator’s non-commitment to an environmental policy (emission standards or taxes)
affects the innovation incentives of a monopolist. They find that a tax is preferable to an
emission standard when the regulator cannot commit to maintaining the policy once the
monopolist has chosen their innovation effort. In contrast, when there is commitment, the
two policies are equivalent. Our analysis differs in three ways from this literature. First,
our focus is on the automobile market, i.e., on durable goods that are not homogeneous.
Second, we analyse a multi-stage game in which the regulator sets optimal environmental
standards. Finally and most importantly, we focus our attention on the consequences of
regulatory capture for environmental standards and innovation.
While ignoring environmental innovation, another stream of the literature that relates
to our work compares the welfare properties of specific environmental policies. Requate
(2006) surveys the theoretical literature on environmental policy in the presence of imperfect
competition. As regulatory instruments he considers emission taxes, tradable permits,
and both absolute and relative standards. He concludes that, typically, under imperfect
competition the second-best optimal price for pollution is below the marginal social damage
caused by the pollution, and that taxes and emission standards are mostly equivalent policy
instruments. Besanko (1987) compares performance standards and design standards that
regulate pollution through a minimum usage requirement of an emissions control input.
He shows that a welfare comparison of these policy instruments depends strongly on the
regulator’s objective function. Thus, if she wants to minimise the sum of emissions and
pollution damage costs, performance standards are preferable. In contrast, if consumer and
producer welfare is taken into account, the comparison becomes indeterminate. Helfand
(1991) analyses how firm’s profits are affected by five different environmental control policies,
namely, emission standards, performance standards on outputs and inputs, and output and
input restrictions. Her results indicate that an emission standard yields the highest profits.
However, she also shows that the comparison of different standards is sensitive to the
underlying model assumptions. In contrast to this literature, in this chapter, we do not
compare different environmental policies, but focus on second-best emission standards with
and without regulatory capture when firms can invest in pollution-reducing technologies.
Finally, some studies have considered different environmental policies in the automobile
market. Shao et al. (2017) analyse optimal subsidies and price discount rates for electric cars
in the electric and gasoline vehicle market. They find that, while both policy instruments
yield equivalent welfare outcomes, a subsidy incentive scheme is preferable for the regulator,
as it is less costly to implement. Ahmed and Segerson (2007) compare a quota and an
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average efficiency standard in terms of their effectiveness in reducing emissions in the
automobile market. They find that the optimal policy choice depends on the magnitude of
unit damages, where the quota policy is preferable in terms of welfare and profits, as long as
unit damages are sufficiently high. While our focus is completely different to that of these
studies, our analysis is based on similar modelling assumption regarding consumer demand
in the automobile market.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we review some
of the main characteristics of the automobile industry. Based on these, Section 2.3 sets up
the theoretical model. Section 2.4 contains the main results of the chapter and Section 2.5
some extensions. Section 2.6 provides conclusions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 Characteristics of the automobile industry
In this section we review some of the characteristics of the automobile market which we
enumerate as stylised facts. These facts are used to built up the theoretical framework in
Section 2.3.
Consumer demand. Typically consumers purchase one unit of car or none. Consumers
are heterogeneous in tastes and when they decide to purchase an automobile, they buy
different types of cars. The canonical model for this type of demand in the context of the
automobile sector is from Bresnahan (1987). For our purpose, we have to consider that
diesel cars are usually more expensive than gasoline cars. In contrast, the energy cost of
diesel cars is lower than that of gasoline cars (see Table 2.1). For example, in Germany in
2018 a Volkswagen Golf with a gasoline engine (1.2 TSI BMT) was 2550 euros less expensive
than its counterpart with a diesel engine (1.6 TDI BMT). Instead, the costs per kilometre
driven were 2 cents higher for the automobile with the gasoline engine.2 Therefore in Europe,
typically, we observe that frequent drivers that travel more than 20,000 kilometres per year
purchase diesel cars, while casual drivers buy gasoline cars yielding almost equal market
shares for the two type of engine cars. In the US, fuel prices of diesel have been above
those of gasoline for a long time. Therefore, despite the higher fuel economy of diesel cars,
consumers could hardly recover the higher sales prices of these cars such that the market
share of diesel cars has never been above 1% (see Table 2.2). We obtain:
Fact 1: Gasoline and diesel car drivers are segmented at the intensive margin and in
general, frequent drivers purchase diesel cars while casual drivers buy gasoline cars.
Competition. The automobile sector is an oligopoly industry that operates worldwide
with a considerable number of manufactures (in 2017, there were more than 16 firms with a
market share above 1%). Nevertheless, there remain several issues of concern regarding the
2For a detailed comparison of these two models see Autozeitung (2018).
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Table 2.1: Pump price of fuel.
European Union Germany United States China
Year Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel
2010 1.69 1.61 1.90 1.68 0.76 0.84 1.11 1.04
2012 1.92 1.83 1.96 1.88 0.97 1.05 1.37 1.28
2014 1.78 1.64 1.80 1.58 0.76 0.97 1.17 1.09
2016 1.32 1.20 1.39 1.20 0.71 0.65 0.96 0.81
Pump price for gasoline and diesel fuel. Prices are aggregated by the median, and converted to US $
by exchange rates. They refer to the most widely sold grade of fuel. Source: Bank (2020).
Table 2.2: Market share of passenger cars.
European Union United States China
Year Gasoline Diesel Others Gasoline Diesel Others Gasoline Diesel Others
2008 43.1% 49.3% 7.5% 97.4% 0.1% 2,5% - - -
2009 45.8% 43.8% 10.4% 97.2% 0.5% 2,3% - - -
2010 40.9% 48.6% 10.5% 95.5% 0.7% 3.8% 93.5% 2.5% 4.0%
2011 39.8% 52.4% 7.8% 97.0% 0.8% 2.3% 93.5% 2.5% 4.0%
2012 37.9% 52.4% 9.7% 95.5% 0.9% 3.5% 94.5% 2.5% 3.0%
2013 38.1% 46.7% 15.2% 94.8% 0.9% 4.3% 94.5% 2.5% 3.0%
2014 40.9% 49.0% 10.1% 95.7% 1.0% 3.3% 96.0% 2.0% 2.0%
2015 39.4% 42.6% 18.0% 95.9% 0.9% 3.1% 97.0% 1.0% 2.0%
2016 41.3% 39.5% 19.2% 96.9% 0.5% 2.6% 97.5% 0.0% 2.5%
2017 44.6% 36.8% 18.5% 96.1% 0.3% 3.7% 96.0% 0.0% 4.0%
Market share of passenger cars by engine type. Sources: Eurostat (2020), EPA (2019), JATO (2020).
competitiveness of the industry in specific markets. First, over the last two decades in some
regions a tendency towards higher market concentration has been observed. Thus, in the
European Union and EFTA in 2019, the 3 largest firms had a market share of 50,6% while in
2007, they had a market share of 43%. During this period the number of firms with a market
share of more than 1% declined from 15 in 2007 to 13 in 2019 (Bekker, 2020). Second,
different forms of alliances have gained importance since the 2000s. Examples of such
alliances are the mergers between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1998 or Fiat-Chrysler and
PSA in 2020 and cross-shareholding agreements among firms as between Kia and Hyundai
in 1998 or Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi starting in 1999. Third, common ownership of
automobile companies by investment funds has become a salient feature in some markets
(López and Vives, 2019). Thus, for the two main US automobile manufactures, Ford and
General Motors, we find the same names among its five most important shareholders, namely,
The Vanguard Group (7.54% and 6.87%), Capital Research & Management (1.39% and
7.02%), and Black Rock Fund Advisers (2.43% and 4.29%).3 Finally, it has been apparent that
automobile producers have eliminated competition in specific market segments by cartel
formation. For instance, Daimler, BMW and Volkswagen received an 100 million euro fine in
2019 for forming a cartel to fix steel prices, and the same companies are currently accused
to restrict competition on the development of technology to clean the emissions of petrol
and diesel passenger cars. For all these reasons, regulatory agencies should not presume
3For further details on the top stockholders of these companies see CNN (2020).
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that competition in automobile markets is sufficiently high but rather be concerned about
how to guarantee competition in these markets yielding the following conclusion:
Fact 2: Despite the large number of car manufactures, lack of competition is an issue
in automobile markets.
Regulatory capture. The current criterion of regulatory agencies used both in the
US and the EU to assess alliances among firms emphasises its consequences to consumer
welfare. For instance with regard to mergers, as indicated by Banal-Estañol et al. (2008), “in
the US, the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test (SLC) has been interpreted such that a
merger is unlawful if it is likely that it will lead to an increase in price (i.e., to a decrease in
consumer surplus). In the EU, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that the Commission
should take into account, above all, the interests of consumers when considering efficiency
claims of merging firms (art. 79–81)”.4 However, in the case of the automobile industry
there are compelling reasons to believe that regulatory policy does not always follow that
criterion. First, as observed in Table 2.3, emissions standards vary substantially among
countries. A possible explanation for this fact are the different environmental concerns
in these countries as it is not clear which of the two motors, diesel or gasoline, is more
harmful to the environment. Diesel cars emit less hydrocarbons (HC), carbon monoxide
(CO) and lead pollution than gasoline cars, and therefore, are advantageous for fighting
global warming. However, diesel cars produce more noxious gases, such as nitrogen oxides
(NOx), and significantly more particulate matter (PM) than gasoline cars, and hence are more
harmful to health. Another explanation is regulatory capture as environmental regulation has
a large impact on market performance. Thus, as observed in Table 2.2, in 2017 the market
share of diesel cars in the EU was 36.8%, while in the US and China their market share was
below 0.5%. This difference can be explained largely by governmental intervention. On
the one hand, US emission regulations do not distinguish between diesel and gasoline cars,
and apply similar standards to diesel cars as those for gasoline cars in the EU. Therefore,
standards are hardly to be met for diesel car producers which are mainly producers from
abroad the US. On the other hand, taxation in Europe and particularly in Germany is more
favourable for diesel cars. Thus, pump prices for this fuel are substantially lower than those
for gasoline. In contrast, in the US the opposite occurs. The differences in emission standards
between the US, the EU and China observed in Table 2.3, therefore stem less from differences
in environmental objectives and more from the fact that European (particularly German) car
producers have a competitive advantage on diesel engine technologies.5
Other reasons for regulatory capture are that in many countries automobile manufac-
turers receive substantial subsidies often justified with the argument that the industry creates
4For more information about the recent criteria of the US and EU competition policies see Mateus and Moreira
(2010).
5Official lobbying expenditure of the automotive industry in 2019 amounted to $69.7 million in the US (CRP,
2020). In 2014, car manufacturers and their trade associations spent more than €18 million on lobbying
activities in Brussels (CEO, 2015).
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Table 2.3: Emission standards in the EU, US, and China.
CO HC NOx PM
Year Standard Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel
European Union
1992 Euro 1 2.2 1 - - - - - 0.14
1996 Euro 2 2.3 1 0.2 - - - - 0.08
2000 Euro 3 1 0.5 0.1 - 0.15 0.5 - 0.05
2005 Euro 4 1 0.5 0.1 - 0.08 0.25 - 0.025
2009 Euro 5a 1 0.5 0.1 - 0.06 0.18 0.005 0.005
2014 Euro 6 1 0.5 0.1 - 0.06 0.08 0.005 0.005
United States
1994 Tier 1 2.11 2.11 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.25 - -
2004 Tier 2 2.11 2.11 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 - -
2017 Tier 3 2.11 2.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 - -
China
2000 China 1 - - - - - - - -
2002 China 2 - - - - - - - -
2005 China 3 2.3 0.64 0.2 - 0.15 0.5 - 0.05
2008 China 4 1 0.5 0.1 - 0.08 0.25 - 0.025
2012 China 5 1 0.5 0.1 - 0.06 0.18 0.0045 0.0045
2015 China 6a 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.0045 0.0045
2018 China 6b 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.05 0.035 0.035 0.003 0.003
Emission standards for passenger cars in the European Union, United States and China (g/km). For
the US, emission standards are for passenger cars at 50,000 miles/5 years. US legislation on air
quality and vehicle emissions is a combination of federal law, and stricter Californian standards
(known as LEV), which may also be voluntarily applied by other states. For details see DGIP (2016)
and TransportPolicy.net (2019).
and guarantees employment (CDG, 2014). Moreover, we observe government ownership in
some of the most important automobile producers meaning that the public sector is co-owner
and regulator of these firms at the same time. For example, on January 31, 2019, the French
government had a 15.01% stake in Renault and the German State of Lower Saxony a 11.8%
stake in Volkswagen Group. Consequently, we should expect that regulatory policy in relation
to this industry follows a criteria that also takes producer profits into account. This sums up
to:
Fact 3: Regulatory capture is an important issue in the automobile industry.
Innovation and environmental regulation. Developing and producing automobiles
is a highly research intensive activity. In fact, the automobile industry is among the most
innovation intensive industries in many developed countries. According to OECD (2020),
R&D expenditures in the automobile industry in 2017 amounted to 37.3% of all R&D
expenditures in Germany, 25.9% in Japan, 8.5% in China, 7.3% in France, and 6.0% in
the United States. Kuik (2006) identifies as the most important drivers of innovation: i)
consumer demand (for comfort, safety and fuel economy), ii) international competition,
and iii) environmental objectives and regulations. According to survey information from
German automobile manufactures in 2004, “the main motives for environmental product
innovations were: customer and cost pressure as well as environmental regulation and
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company environmental policy. The main motives for process innovation were the opening
of new markets, gaining of competitive advantage as well as the saving of resources, CO2
reduction because of the Kyoto Protocol and company environmental policy objectives, and
various pieces of environmental regulation” such as Euro 4 and emission limit values (Kuik,
2006).
In this context, the question whether environmental regulation spurs environmental
innovation or regulation rather stipulates emission standards that have proven to be already
technological feasible by the industry has been extensively discussed. As an example of
technology-forcing legislation often the Clean Air Act of 1970 is quoted (Kuik, 2006; Johnson,
2016). The act specified emissions standards for which no technologies existed at the
time the act was passed. As a response to its environmental requirements, the three-way
catalyst was developed in 1981. This in turn required the implementation of computer
technology in cars which prepared the ground for further improvements in car safety and
fuel economy. By contrast, Gerard and Lave (2003) argue that the approval of the Clean Air
Act required specific technical, political, economic, and administrative conditions that were
favourable at that time. In general, a technology-forcing strategy is very risky as its results
are highly uncertain and politically often unfeasible due to the influence of stakeholders or
an unfavourable business cycle. In fact, many of the changes in environmental regulations
are the result of negotiations between regulators and car producers as, for example, the
Voluntary Agreement for Clean Cars between EPA and US automobile manufactures in 1998,
before the implementation of the Tier 2 standards.67 In this line, a study by DLR (2004)
concluded that specific changes in CO2 emissions over the period 1995-2003 were primarily
caused by technological developments and not demand or regulation driven. We summarise
these findings as follows:
Fact 4: Environmental innovation and regulation fed back mutually with no clear
preponderance regarding their causal relationship.
On the basis of these characteristics of the automobile industry, in the remainder of this
chapter, we test the following hypothesis that, particularly in the aftermath of the Volkswagen
emissions scandal in 2015 has become a common belief:
H1: “Regulatory capture in the automobile industry has caused more emissions and
less environmental innovation with regards to passenger cars”.
6A similar voluntary agreement to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and to improve their fuel efficiency
has been reached in 1998 between the EU and the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA),
the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), and the Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association
(KAMA).
7See also Gersbach and Glazer (1999), who discuss the commitment problem of regulatory programs in the US
to reduce automobile emissions resulting in the non-investment in pollution-reducing technology by firms. The
authors show that this hold-up problem may be overcome by the regulator through the issuance of tradeable
permits. However, this is only the case when firms do not collude or negotiate environmental standards through
industry associations, as it has been often the case in the past.
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2.3 The model
Demand
Consider a market with two different types of cars: gasoline (G) and diesel (D). We
assume a continuum of consumers who vary in their willingness to pay, denoted by θ , which
is uniformly distributed on [0,1] such that demand is linear in price. Each consumer either
buys a single car (diesel or gasoline) or decides not to buy a car. The utility of a consumer of
type θ in each of these cases is given by
UθD = (1+α)θ − pD, (2.1)
UθG = θ − pG, and (2.2)
Uθ0 = 0, (2.3)
where 0≤ α < 1, and pD and pG denote the price of the diesel and the gasoline car, respect-







where ωm is the quality, p
e
m the unit price of energy and rm the energy consumption of each
car type (m = D, G), a positive value of α means that, for cars of the same quality, the energy
cost of diesel cars is lower than that of gasoline cars. As observed in Table 2.1, this has been
the case over the past decades in the European Union and China. A natural interpretation of
the parameter θ is the number of kilometres that consumers drive each year. In this case,
under pD > pG, the lower energy price of diesel cars (α > 0) implies, in accordance with Fact
1, that frequent drivers purchase diesel cars and casual drivers gasoline cars.
Equations (2.1) to (2.3) yield the critical values for buying a diesel car, a gasoline car,
or no car. When α > 0, consumers buy a diesel car if
UθD ≥ U
θ









G > 0, i.e., θ > θ > pG ≡ θ . (2.5)
For α = 0 consumers exclusively buy the cheaper car, and when pD = pG = θ both
types of car share the market evenly, i.e., qD = qG = 1− θ/2.
Given the prices of diesel and gasoline cars, we obtain that consumers purchase: (i) a
diesel car if θ ∈ [θ , 1]; (ii) a gasoline car if θ ∈ [θ ,θ]; (iii) no car if θ ∈ [0,θ]. Consequently,
for α > 0, we obtain the following demand functions:8
8In the case that pD = pG = θ , both types of car share the market equally, i.e., qD = qG = 1− 2θ = 1− pD − pG .
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qG = θ − θ =
pD − (1+α) pG
α
, (2.7)
and their corresponding inverse demand functions:
pD = (1+α) (1− qD)− qG, (2.8)
pG = 1− qD − qG. (2.9)















Gasoline and diesel cars are produced either by different firms or by multi-product firms.
Firms have linear production costs of the form CG(qG) = cqG and CD(qD) = kcqD, where
0< c < 1, k > 1 and (1− c) = 1+α− kc ≡ A.9 We assume that each unit of output generates
one unit of pollution such that the firms’ emissions can be written as em = qm− xm, m = D, G,
where xm stands for the firm’s environmental innovation. As it is common in the literature
(see e.g., Amir et al., 2018; Moner-Colonques and Rubio, 2016; Montero, 2002; Petrakis
and Xepapadeas, 2001), we assume that innovation costs are quadratic, i.e., C(xm) = x2m/2.
Similarly, the per unit damage caused by pollution is assumed to increase with the emission






/2, where d > 3 (1+α).10 By assuming
a common d for gasoline and diesel car emissions, we consider that both types of cars are
considered equally harmful, which is a realistic assumption for environmental regulation in
the EU over the past decades.11 From the above, it follows that firms’ profits stemming from
the production of diesel and gasoline cars are:
9This assumption means that the higher production costs of diesel cars compensate their higher utility for
consumers. While the assumption does not affect the result qualitatively, it allows the exposition of the results
to be simplified.
10Assuming a lower bound for d guarantees non-negative equilibrium values and simplifies the exposition of the
results.
11Notice that considering gasoline and diesel cars as equally harmful means that environmental standards are set
differently for the two types of cars because their engines cause different levels of HC, CO and NOx emissions
(see Table 2.3). In Section 2.5 we also consider the case that dD > dG , which can explain the observation that
in the US environmental standards are set in a way that makes them more difficult to fulfil for diesel cars than
for gasoline cars.
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(pG − c)− x2G/2= qG (1− qD − qG − c)− x
2
G/2, (2.12)
respectively. Following the insights from Fact 2, we consider different market structures
according to their degree of competitiveness, namely, multiproduct monopoly, single-product
duopoly (one diesel and one gasoline car producer), and oligopoly with both types of firms.
Environmental regulation
The regulator limits the level of pollution generated by each industry by choosing
the emission standards eD and eG. To determine these standards the regulator maximises a
weighted social welfare function of the form
W = λCS +µ (πD +πG)− νD. (2.13)
With this welfare function, we can capture different regulator concerns regarding the
stakeholders’ welfare. Without loss of generality, we can normalise one of the parameters
and set λ = 1. Moreover, as higher (lower) concerns about future generations, i.e., pollution
captured by ν, is equivalent to assuming higher (lower) environmental damages which is in-
dicated by d. We also set ν = 1 and interpret hereinafter d, as measuring both environmental
damages and concerns about future generations.
Regarding µ, we analyse two scenarios. First, we consider the case µ = 0 denoted as a
‘consumer-orientated regulator’. This case reflects the current criterion applied by regulatory
authorities to assess the effects on welfare of any kind of competition policy such as joint
ventures, mergers, and other agreements among firms.12 Second, we consider the case µ = 1.
In this case, producers’ profits have the same weight as consumer surplus. We denote this case
as a ‘producer-orientated regulator’ or ‘regulatory capture’, because under current standards,
the regulator gives too much consideration to producers. Later, we consider the case in which
µ is continuous and allow for both 0 < µ < 1 and µ > 1. Thereby, the formulation of the
welfare function in (2.13) captures important aspects of regulatory practices as summarised
in Fact 3.
Timing of the game
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the firms choose their environmental
innovation effort xD and xG, respectively. Simultaneously, the regulator decides on the
maximum amount of emissions by setting the emission standards eD and eG. In Stage 2,
12For more information about the recent criteria of the US and EU competition policies see Mateus and Moreira
(2010).
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after observing the emission standards and the innovation efforts, both firms determine
their production levels qD and qG, respectively. The assumption that the levels of total
emissions and innovation efforts are chosen simultaneously is justified in Fact 4.13 Note that,
here, it is tantamount to assuming that the desired level of total emissions is established
directly via emission standards or indirectly via a performance standard hm = em/qm. This is
because, once the environmental innovation and emission standards are chosen, performance
standards are determined completely as hm = em/ (em + xm). The focus on emission standards
is motivated by the fact that these are in the focus of all climate summits (e.g. Madrid
2019, Copenhagen 2003, or Kyoto 1997) to determine emission levels at the country level.
Then, national governments try to reach the agreed emission levels by using various policy
instruments (taxes, subsidies, permission standards, among others). As usual, the game is
solved by backward induction.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Multiproduct monopoly
Consider a regulator that deals with an automobile industry that does not compete in
environmental innovation as it seems to have occurred in part of the European car market,
where car manufactures have formed cartels to restrict competition on the development
of emission-reducing technology. In this sense, let us assume that the regulator faces a
multiproduct monopoly, i.e., a firm (or cartel) that produces both types of cars, diesel and
gasoline.
In Stage 2, for given levels of xD, xG, eD, and eG, the firm determines its production
level qD and qG, respectively. As qm = em+ xm, this quantity choice is tantamount to choosing
the level of emissions. From the profit functions in (2.11) and (2.12), it is straightforward
that for the firm it is optimal to set em = em, i.e., to pollute as much as allowed.
In Stage 1, the firm’s environmental innovation is obtained from:
max
xD ,xG
π = (xD + eD) ((1+α) (1− xD − eD)− xG − eG − kc)
+(xG + eG) (1− xD − eD − xG − eG − c)− x2D/2− x
2
G/2 (2.14)
From the first-order conditions, we obtain:
13Notice, however, that our main results do not depend on this assumption. For the effect of different assumptions
regarding the timing of decisions see, for example, Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2016).
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(A− 2eD − 2eG − 2xD) . (2.16)
From (2.15) and (2.16), we observe that environmental innovation efforts are strategic
substitutes. Moreover, higher pollution standards for each type of car lead to a reduction in
environmental innovation for both type of cars. Simultaneously, the regulator chooses eD


















(1− 2µ) (d −α (1− 2µ))
∆
xG, (2.18)
where ∆≡ d2 − (1− 2µ) (α+ 2) d + (1− 2µ)2α. From (2.17) and (2.18), we obtain
the following result:
Lemma 2.1. The regulator’s emission standards eD and eG, and the firms environmental
innovation efforts xD and xG are: (i) strategic substitutes if the regulator is producer-orientated
(i.e., µ > 1/2), (ii) strategic complements if the regulator is consumer-orientated (i.e., µ < 1/2).
For µ = 1/2, the regulator’s emission standards are independent of the firms’ innovation efforts
(eD = eG = A/d).
The regulator uses the emission standards to exert an indirect influence on the pro-
ducers’ environmental innovation efforts. From Lemma 2.1, we observe that a producer-
orientated regulator responds to a decrease in innovation efforts with an increase in em,
i.e., by abating less pollution. This makes it possible to mitigate the impact of changes in
innovation effort on output and profits. By contrast, a consumer-orientated regulator uses
emission standards as an incentive device for innovation efforts. Thus, they punish lower
innovation efforts with a reduction in em and reward more innovation with an increase in em.
Thereby, the effect of any change in innovation efforts on output and profits is aggravated.
To assess the impact of different weights in the welfare function on equilibrium out-
comes obtained from equations (2.15)-(2.18), we consider the two extreme cases: (i) a
completely consumer-orientated regulator (µ= 0) and (ii) a producer-orientated regulator
who weights consumer surplus and profits equally (µ= 1). The following result shows the
equilibrium values in the two cases.
Lemma 2.2. Under multiproduct monopoly with a consumer-orientated regulator (µ = 0), the
Nash equilibrium values are:
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x M ,0D =
d2 − (3α+ 2) d +α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A, x M ,0G =
(2α+ 1) d2 − (3α+ 2) d +α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A,
eM ,0D =
(3α+ 2) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A, eM ,0G =
2 (α+ 1) d −α




(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A, qM ,0G =
[(2α+ 1) d −α] d
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A.
With a producer-orientated regulator (µ= 1), the Nash equilibrium values are:
x M ,1D =
d2 − (3α+ 2) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A, x M ,1G =
(2α+ 1) d2 − (α+ 2) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A,
eM ,1D =
3 (α+ 1) d +α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A, eM ,1G =
(3+ 4α) d + 2α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A,
qM ,1D =
(d + 1) d
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A, qM ,1G =
[(2α+ 1) d +α] (d + 1)
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A.
The following result gives the comparison of the equilibrium values in both cases.
Proposition 2.1. Regulatory capture yields to more emissions and less innovation, i.e., eM ,1m >




m , m = D, G. The production of gasoline cars is lower and that of diesel cars
is lower (higher) when the utility of diesel cars is high (low) and damages are low (high), i.e.,






D for αÑ αq(d) with ∂ αq/∂ d > 0.
To interpret this result, note that the firm can increase its production either by increasing
emissions or by intensifying environmental innovation. As increasing emissions does not
have any cost to the firm, so that it pollutes as much as allowed, naturally, the firm prefers
this form of increasing output. Therefore, the regulator exerts a high degree of control
over production and production costs by choosing the emission standards. We call this the
‘production cost effect’ of emission standard regulation. As an indicator of this control, in
Proposition 2.1, we observe that even if the firm compensates higher (lower) standards with
less (more) innovation, the effect of changes in emission standards on output dominates the
effect of changes in innovation. It follows that a regulator that is concerned about producer
profits sets higher levels of em as this allows the car manufacturer to produce the same
output with lower innovation costs and thus with higher profits. We conclude that under
multi-product monopoly hypothesis H1 is confirmed, i.e., regulatory capture yields to more
emissions and less innovation.
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2.4.2 Duopoly competition
To assess in how far the former results depend on the absence of competition in the product
market and in environmental innovation, now, consider that the regulator faces duopoly
competition under which diesel cars are produced by one firm (D) and gasoline cars by the
other firm (G). As before, in Stage 2, quantities are completely determined by the firms’
innovation efforts and the emission standards chosen by the regulator.




πD = (xD + eD) ((1+α) (1− xD − eD)− xG − eG − kc)− x2D/2, (2.19)
max
xG
πG = (xG + eG) (1− xD − eD − xG − eG − c)− x2G/2. (2.20)








(A− eD − 2eG − xD) . (2.22)
A comparison of these conditions with equations (2.15) and (2.16) reveals that a
multi-product monopoly reacts with a stronger reduction of environmental innovation to
cross-product emission standards and innovation than under duopoly competition. Therefore,
for the same emission standard levels, we have more environmental innovation with two
independent firms producing one car type each than with a multi-product firm.
The regulator’s choice of emission standards is tantamount to the problem under
multi-product monopoly and yields the same reaction functions as in (2.17) and (2.18). The
following result is the counterpart to Lemma 2.2 and states the equilibrium values obtained
from equations (2.17), (2.18), (2.21), and (2.22) for the two cases µ= 0 and µ= 1.
Lemma 2.3. Under duopoly competition with a consumer-orientated regulator (µ = 0), the
Nash equilibrium values are:
x0D =
2d2 − 4d (1+α) +α
(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα−α)
A, x0G =
[2d (1+α)−α] d − (4d + 2dα−α)




(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα−α)
A, e0G =
4d + 2dα−α




(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα−α)
A, q0G =
[2d (1+α)−α] d
(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα−α)
A.
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With a producer-orientated regulator (µ= 1), the Nash equilibrium values are:
x1D =
2d (d − 1−α)
(2d + 1) (4d + 3dα+α)
A, x1G =
[2d (1+α) +α] (d − 1)




(2d + 1) (4d + 3dα+α)
A, e1G =
2 [2d (1+α) +α]
(2d + 1) (4d + 3dα+α)
A,
q1D =
2d (d + 1)
(2d + 1) (4d + 3dα+α)
A, q1G =
[2d (1+α) +α] (d + 1)
(2d + 1) (4d + 3dα+α)
A.
Lemma 2.3 shows that emission standards for diesel and gasoline cars compare differ-
ently under a consumer-and a producer-orientated regulator. Thus, a consumer-orientated
regulator allows higher emissions for diesel cars than for gasoline cars (e0D−e
0
G > 0). However,
under a producer-orientated regulator, the opposite is the case (e1D − e
1
G < 0). Moreover, we
observe that diesel car producers exert less environmental innovation effort than gasoline car
producers under both types of regulators (x0D− x
0




G < 0). Finally, we observe that
less diesel cars than gasoline cars are produced in the two cases (q0D − q
0





The next result gives a comparison of the equilibrium outcomes under a producer- and a
consumer-orientated regulator.
Proposition 2.2. Regulatory capture yields to:







and x1D > x
0
D;
(ii) less (more) emissions, less (more) output and more (less) innovation for gasoline










G for α ≷ α(d),
∂ α/∂ d < 0;
(iii) less emissions and more innovation in total. Total output is larger (smaller) when α
and/or d are low (high).
The intuition behind the results in Proposition 2.2 is as follows. We observe that, as
compared to a producer-orientated regulator, a consumer-orientated regulator increases the
competition between gasoline and diesel cars. This is achieved by facilitating the production
of diesel cars through permitting higher emissions for this type of car. If the standards for
gasoline cars are kept constant, the gasoline car producer is forced to reduce prices. Thereby,
the gasoline car producer can compensate the loss of market share to the diesel car producer
by gaining consumers that otherwise would not buy a car. Consequently, consumers can buy
more cars at lower prices and consumer surplus is increased. Naturally, the emission standard
for the gasoline car producer also differs between a producer- and a consumer-orientated
regulator. We observe that the allowed emission level for the gasoline car producer is also
higher under the latter when emission damages are small (i.e., with a low weight in the social
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welfare function), or when the difference between diesel and gasoline cars in consumer
preferences is small. Otherwise, a consumer-orientated regulator requires the gasoline car
manufacturer to abate more pollution as compared to a producer-orientated regulator. We
call this effect the ‘competition intensifying effect’ of environmental regulation.
From Proposition 2.2, we observe that total emissions and quantities are unequivocally
higher and total innovation effort is smaller under a consumer-orientated regulator when
environmental damages are low and/or the utility of diesel cars is small. By contrast, when
d and/or α are high, emissions, quantities, and innovation efforts for gasoline and diesel
cars have opposite signs such that the total impact on these variables is not clear a priory.
However, the third result in Proposition 2.2 states that, in total, regulatory capture yields to
less emissions and more innovation, while with regard to total output the aggregate effect
depends on α and d.
While hypothesis H1 is confirmed under multiproduct monopoly (Proposition 2.1),
the opposite is the case under duopoly competition (Proposition 2.2). Therefore, we can
conclude that under duopoly competition, the ‘competition intensifying effect’ dominates the
‘production cost effect’. We obtain that competition intensity is a crucial factor for assessing
the impact of regulatory capture on environmental regulation and innovation. Limiting the
producer influence on regulatory policies would yield lower emissions under multiproduct
monopoly, but higher emissions under duopoly competition.
Proposition 2.2 reveals two important drawbacks of environmental policies focused
primarily on maximising consumer surplus. First, this kind of policy inevitably increases
total emissions. Second, it disincentivises environmental innovation effort because emission
standards and innovation efforts are strategic substitutes, as observed in equations (2.21)
and (2.22).
2.4.3 Oligopoly competition
From the preceding analysis, we observe that the degree of market competition is essential to
the impact of regulatory capture on environmental emission standards and innovation efforts.
Now, we analyse in how far the results are influenced by competition between more than
two firms. Let us assume that there are N firms in the market, n of which are multi-product
firms producing both car types, while nD and nG firms only produce diesel and gasoline
cars, respectively. Moreover, we assume that competition between diesel and gasoline car
producers is already intense as taste differences regarding the two types of cars become
negligible, i.e., α→ 0. Consequently, the competition intensifying effect is smallest in this
situation. In analogy to the baseline model, we assume that the total production of gasoline
and diesel cars is determined by the emission standards and the sum of the environmental
innovation efforts of all firms, i.e.,
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Total emissions are equally distributed over all producers such that the firm’s output




eD + xDi and qGi =
1
n+ nG
eG + xGi .
































(A− eD − xD − eG − xG)−
x2G j
2









(A− (1+α) (eD + xD)− eG − xG)−
x2Dj
2
, j = 1, ..., nD.
Summing up the first-order conditions, we obtain the following reaction functions for
total environmental innovation efforts:
xD =
(2N − nG)A
2N − nG + 4
−
2n+ nG + (N − nD) (2N − nG)
(n+ nG) (2N − nG + 4)
eG −
2N − nG + 2
2N − nG + 4
(eD + xG) , (2.23)
xG =
(2N − nD)A
2N − nD + 4
−
2n+ nD + (2N − nD) (N − nG)
(n+ nD) (2N − nD + 4)
eD −
2N − nD + 2
2N − nD + 4
(eG + xD) , (2.24)
that together with the regulator’s reaction functions (2.17) and (2.18) determine the
Nash equilibrium values for emission standards and total innovation efforts.
Lemma 2.4. With n multi-product firms, nD diesel car producers and nG gasoline car producers,
the symmetric Nash equilibrium emission standards are given by:
eD = eG =
[6+ (1−µ) (3N + n− 6)] (n+ nG) (n+ nD)A
(2µ− 1) (5n (nG + nD) + 6nGnD + 4n2) + (n+ nG) (n+ nD) (3N + n+ 6) d
.
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The equilibrium innovation efforts are determined by:
xD =
2n+ 3nD
3N + n+ 6

A−
2 (N + 1)− nG
2 (n+ nD)
eD −
4n (N + 1) + 3nGnD






3N + n+ 6

A−
2 (N + 1)− nD
2 (n+ nG)
eG −
3nGnD + 4n (N + 1)




The result in Lemma 2.4 makes it possible to assess the impact of market competitiveness
on emission standards and innovation efforts in a symmetric equilibrium through changes in
the number of firms. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2.3. A necessary condition for e1 ≥ e0 is that N = 1, i.e., only under monopoly
total emissions do not decrease under regulatory capture. Otherwise, for N > 1, regulatory
capture reduces total emissions and increases environmental innovation, i.e., ∂ em/∂ µ < 0 and
∂ xm/∂ µ > 0 for N ≥ 2, m= D, G.
The previous analysis shows that, under duopoly competition, a consumer-orientated
regulator allows more emissions than a producer-orientated regulator. The reason for this
result is that higher emission standards yield more competition in the car market, which
benefits consumers, and that the competition intensifying effect dominates the production cost
effect of environmental regulation. We could expect that the competition intensifying effect
becomes less important with more competition in the car market such that the duopoly result
will not hold in oligopoly. Proposition 2.3 shows that this is not the case. The competition
intensifying effect of environmental regulation still dominates the production cost effect
such that total emissions will increase and environmental innovation will decrease when the
regulator gives less weight to producer surplus, i.e., hypothesis H1 is rejected.
From Lemma 2.4, we also observe that emission standards are monotonically decreasing
in µ. Therefore, our results are not limited to the two extreme cases analysed in the preceding
subsections and also hold for situations in which regulatory capture means that producer
surplus is valued less (0 < µ < 1) or more (µ > 1) than consumer surplus. Hence, the
general message of our analysis is that, in a competitive market (N > 1), a reduction of the
influence that producers exert on environmental regulation, ceteris paribus, yields more
emissions and less environmental innovation.
2.5 Extensions
Our previous assumptions capture well the characteristics of European car markets. In this
section, we provide two extensions that modify two of our basic assumption in allowing a
better fit to some of the aspects of the US (and the recent Chinese) car market. Thus, in the
US, the environmental standards for diesel cars and gasoline cars are identical and similar to
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the ones for gasoline cars in the EU (see Table 2.3). Consequently, it is rather difficult for
diesel cars to meet the US standards for NOx and PM, while they easily fulfil the CO emission
standards. This means that diesel cars have a competitive disadvantage in the US, as it is
reflected by the observed market shares that diesel cars have reached in the US, as opposed
to those obtained in European countries (see Table 2.2).
There are two possible reasons that can explain these differences in setting environ-
mental standards. First, as US car manufactures are mainly producing passenger cars with
gasoline engines, regulatory capture in the US might mean that the regulator only values the
profits of this industry, i.e., µG = 1, while µD = 0. Such a policy has been commonly observed
in the past and sometimes denominated ’national champions’. Second, as mentioned before,
gasoline cars are more harmful than diesel cars with respect to their CO emissions, while
the opposite is true with respect to NOx and PM emissions. Therefore, European standards
might reflect the view that health diseases in urban areas and global warming are equally
important, while in the US, the former are seen as much more relevant to society. In such a
case, environmental damages of diesel cars would be considered to be higher than those of
gasoline cars resulting in dD > dG. This is an alternative justification for the observation that
in the US, environmental standards are set in a way that makes them more difficult to fulfil
for diesel cars than for gasoline cars.
2.5.1 National Champions
Again, consider a regulator that faces duopoly competition under which diesel cars are
produced by one firm (D) and gasoline cars by the other firm (G). However, as opposed to
Section 2.4.2, the regulator is only concerned about the profits of one type of car producer.
Specifically, she gives weight one to the gasoline car manufacturer (µG = 1) and weight zero
to the diesel car manufacturer (µD = 0). As before, in Stage 1, quantities are completely
determined by the firms’ innovation efforts and the emission standards chosen by the regulator.
In Stage 2, the firms’ optimal innovation choices yield the reaction functions in (2.21) and





















From the solution of this problem, we obtain the following reaction functions for the
regulator:
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2 − (d −α− 1) (d −α)
e∆
xG, (2.27)
where e∆= (d −α− 1) (2d −α)− (d −α−µG)
2.
The following result states the Nash equilibrium values that are determined by the
system of equations (2.21), (2.22), (2.26), and (2.27).
Lemma 2.5. Under duopoly competition with a G-producer-orientated regulator (µG = 1), the
Nash equilibrium values are:
xGD =
2d2 − 2d (1+α)
(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1
A, xGG =
2d (d − 2) (α+ 1) + 1+α+ dα




(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1
A, eGG =
2 (2d − 1) (1+α) + 2d




(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1
A, qGG =
2d2 + (2d − 1) (1+α+ dα)
(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1
A.
A comparison of these equilibrium quantities with those obtained for the case where
the regulator weights the profits of both firms equally yields the following result.
Lemma 2.6. As compared to regulatory capture by both car producers, regulatory capture by a
gasoline car producer leads to lower emission permits for diesel cars (eGD < e
1
D) and more for
gasoline cars (eGG > e
1
G), to which D-producers respond with more and G-producers with less






G). The output of diesel cars is reduced and that of







The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Increasing the permitted emissions
of the G-producer and reducing those of the D-producer means higher profits for the G-
producer as she can increase production without any cost and without varying prices. Both
producers respond to this change by adjusting their environmental innovation effort. As
the effect of changes in emission standards on quantities dominates the effect of changes
in innovation effort, we have less diesel cars and more gasoline cars in the market. The
following result shows the consequences for total emissions, quantities and innovation.
Proposition 2.4. Regulatory capture by a G-producer yields less emissions and more environ-
mental innovation effort. Total output is larger (smaller) when α and/or d are high (small).
49
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
Françeska Tomori
Chapter 2. The impact of environmental regulatory capture on innovation and emissions
From this result, we observe that the conclusions from Proposition 2.2 do not change
when the regulator initially favours only the gasoline car producer such that hypothesis H1,
again, is rejected. Under a regulator that becomes consumer-orientated, total emissions will
increase and total environmental innovation effort will decline.14
2.5.2 Heterogeneous damages
In Section 2.4, we have assumed that gasoline and diesel cars cause the same marginal
damage or are considered as equally harmful. Now, we allow for different assessments of
the marginal damages of the two types of cars in the welfare function. Specifically, let the
environmental damage caused by diesel and gasoline cars be DD = dDe2D/2 and DG = e
2
G,
where dD > 2 (1+α) such that diesel cars are considered as more harmful to society.15 As
can be observed from equations (2.19) and (2.20), this will not change the reaction functions


















(1− 2µ) (dD −α (1− 2µ))
Γ
xG,(2.29)
where Γ ≡ 2dD−(1− 2µ) [dD + 2 (1+α)]+α (1− 2µ)
2. From equations (2.21), (2.22),
(2.28) and (2.29), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2.7. Under duopoly competition with a consumer-orientated regulator (µ = 0), the
Nash equilibrium values are:
x0D =
3dD − 7α− 6
Ω0
A, x0G =














5dD + 4αdD − 2− 2α
Ω0
A,
where Ω0 ≡ 14dD + 10αdD − 4− 5α. With a producer-orientated regulator (µ= 1), the
Nash equilibrium values are:
14Moreover, total output increases, as from Propositions 2.3 and 2.5 we obtain qG − q1 =
2d2(3α+2dα+2)
(2d+1)(4d+α+3dα)((2d−1)(4d+3dα+α)+4d−1)A> 0.
15This is the case for example in most of the low emission zones (LEZ) in European cities that consider NOx
and PM emissions as more harmful than CO emissions, with the result that LEZ regulation is more severe
with regards to diesel cars than to gasoline cars.
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x1D =
4 (dD − (1+α))
Ω1
A, x1G =











4 (dD + 1)
Ω1
A, q1G =
3 (α+ 2 (1+α) dD)
Ω1
A,
where Ω1 ≡ 18dD + 14αdD + 4+ 7α.
The following result compares the equilibrium outcomes under a producer-orientated
and a consumer-orientated regulator.
Proposition 2.5. Regulatory capture yields to:






m, m= D, G);
(ii) a lower production of gasoline cars are produced (q1G < q
0
G);
(iii) a lower (higher) production of gasoline cars when α and/or d are low (high), i.e.,
q1D ≶ q
0
D for dD ≶ d (α).
Proposition 2.5 indicates that the ‘competition intensifying effect’ of environmental
regulation does not depend on the size of the environmental damages of diesel cars. A
consumer-orientated regulator always allows more emissions by diesel cars than a producer-
orientated regulator in order to increase the competition between the two car types. As a
difference to the previous result in Proposition 2.2 where damages of the two car types were
the same, we obtain that a consumer-orientated regulator also always sets higher emission
standards for gasoline cars. As expected, this yields lower environmental innovation for the
two car types. Usually, the impact of changes in emission standards on output dominates the
impact of changes in innovation effort, yielding higher output of the two car types under
a consumer-orientated regulator. Interestingly, we obtain that this is not the case when
damages of diesel cars are (considered) much larger than those of gasoline cars. Then, we
obtain that less diesel cars are produced under a consumer-orientated regulator even when
emission standards are set higher. Despite these modifications, the main conclusions from
Proposition 2.2 remain valid, namely, two important drawbacks of environmental policies
focused primarily on maximising consumer surplus are that they cause more total emissions
and disincentivise environmental innovation effort.
2.6 Conclusions
The automobile market is characterised by both substantial regulation of vehicle emissions
and high investments in environmental innovation. Moreover, car producers in the US and
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the European markets have exerted considerable influence on environmental regulation,
which was evidenced in the 2015 Volkswagen emissions scandal. In this chapter, we study
the consequences of regulatory capture for the choice of emission standards and environ-
mental innovation efforts in the gasoline and diesel car markets. Our results indicate that
regulatory capture leads to less total environmental emissions and more innovation effort
under oligopoly competition, while the opposite is true under multi-product monopoly. This
difference in results stems from a competition intensifying effect. To enhance competition
among car producers, a consumer-orientated regulator sets higher emission standards for
diesel cars from which consumers benefit through lower prices and more automobiles.
An important lesson from our analysis for environmental policy is that the consequences
of regulatory capture for emissions and innovation depend essentially on the degree of
competition in the car market. On the basis that car producers compete, the common belief
that reducing the influence of car manufactures on environmental regulation will lower
emissions and spur environmental innovation is wrong, at least, when it is not accompanied
by stronger concerns about environmental damages or the welfare of future generations. This
indicates that under the assumption that reducing emissions is a general goal, the essential
conflict is not between producers and future generations, but between present and future
welfare.
Although we have focused throughout this chapter on diesel and gasoline automobiles,
the results of our analysis can be applied straightforwardly to environmental regulation
policies related to electric vehicles. Similar to diesel cars, the acquisition costs of electric
cars are generally higher than those of their equivalents with a gasoline engine, while the
operation costs are lower. Assuming that a policy objective is to favour the introduction of
electric cars in order to reduce CO emissions, our results indicate that a consumer-orientated
regulatory policy will not help to achieve this objective. Instead, meeting this goal requires a
welfare shifting from present to future generations.
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2.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
From a comparison of the equilibrium values, we obtain:
x M ,0D − x
M ,1
D =
d2 − (3α+ 2) d +α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A−
d2 − (3α+ 2) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A> 0,
x M ,0G − x
M ,1
G =
(2α+ 1) d2 − (3α+ 2) d +α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A−
(2α+ 1) d2 − (α+ 2) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A
= 2
α2 (d − 1) (2d + 1) (2d − 1) + d2α (4d − 9) + 2d2 (d − 2)
((6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α) ((6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α)
A> 0,
eM ,0D − e
M ,1
D =
(3α+ 2) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A−
3 (α+ 1) d +α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A
=
− (6α+ 5) (d − 3α− 2) d2 − dα− 2α2
((6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α) ((6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α)
A< 0,
eM ,0G − e
M ,1
G =
2 (α+ 1) d −α
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A−
(3+ 4α) d + 2α
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A
=
−3α2 (d − 1) (2d + 1) (2d − 1)− dα
 
16d2 − 22d − 1

− 5d2 (d − 2)
((6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α) ((6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α)
A< 0,




(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A−
(d + 1) d




(4α− 1) d2 + (5α+ 2) d −α

d
((6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α) ((6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α)
A

< 0 for α < (d−2)d4d2+5d−1
> 0 for α > (d−2)d4d2+5d−1
,
qM ,0G − q
M ,1
G =
((2α+ 1) d −α) d
(6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α
A−
((2α+ 1) d +α) (d + 1)
(6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α
A
=
−α2 (d − 1) (2d + 1) (2d − 1)− dα (4d (2d − 1)− 1)− d2 (d − 2)
((6α+ 5) d2 − (5α+ 2) d +α) ((6α+ 5) d2 + (5α+ 2) d +α)
A< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
The first statement in (i) follows as for the numerators of e0D and e
1
D, we have:
(4d + 4dα−α)− 2d (α+ 2) = α (2d − 1)> 0,
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and for the denominators, we have:
(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα−α)− (2d + 1) (4d + 3dα+α)< 0.






5d + 4d2 − 1

α
(4d2 − 1) (4d −α+ 3dα) (4d +α+ 3dα)
A> 0.








(2d +α+ 3dα) + 2d2 (2α+ 3) (5α+ 4)
(4d2 − 1) (4d −α+ 3dα) (4d +α+ 3dα)
A< 0.






−10d + 4d2 − 1











< e1G if α > αe(d)





3 (d − 1) (4d2 − 1)

10d − 4d2 + 1+
Æ
25+ 4d (4d2 − 1) (d + 1)

with









e + 8d (5d + 1)αe + 32d
2








4d2 − 1− 5d











< q1G if α > αq(d)





(d − 1) (4d2 − 1)

5d − 4d2 + 1+
p
9+ 2d − 15d2 − 8d3 + 16d4

with














(d − 1) (4d2 − 1)α2q + 8d2
< 0.
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4d2 − 15d − 1











> x1G if α > αx(d)





2 (d − 1) (4d2 − 1)

15d − 4d2 + 1+
p
49− 18d + 25d2 + 72d3 + 16d4

with













(d − 1) (4d2 − 1)α2x + 12d2
< 0.






























32d2 + (d − 1)
 
4d + 4d2 + 3

α2 + 76d2α+ 48d2
(4d2 − 1) (4d −α+ 3dα) (4d +α+ 3dα)
A< 0.

























< q1D + q
1
G if α > eαq(d)
> q1D + q
1









4− 4d + 9d2 + 16d3

with
∂ eαq/∂ d = −
 
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Proof of Proposition 2.3





6 (N − nG) (N − nD)
d (N − nD) (N − nG) (4N − nG − nD + 6) + 5nnG + 5nnD + 6nGnD + 4n2
−
(4n+ 3nG + 3nD) (N − nG) (N − nD)
d (N − nD) (N − nG) (4N − nG − nD + 6)− (5nnG + 5nnD + 6nGnD + 4n2)
(2.30)
It follows that e1D − e
0
D > 0 if
− (N − nD) (N − nG) (4N − nG − nD − 6) d > 5nnG + 5nnD + 6nGnD + 4n2. (2.31)
While the right-hand-side is always positive, the left-hand-side of this expression is
only positive if 4N − nG − nD − 6 > 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for e1D > e
0
D is that
3N + n< 6, which holds for N = 1. The condition is sufficient as for N = n= 1, we obtain
that the condition in (2.31) becomes d > 2, which holds by assumption. For N = nD = 1 or
N = nG = 1, from (2.30), we have e1D = e
0
D.








5nnG + 5nnD + 6nGnD + 4n2 + (n+ nD) (n+ nG) (3N + n− 6) d
[(2µ− 1) (5n (nG + nD) + 6nGnD + 4n2) + (n+ nG) (n+ nD) (3N + n+ 6) d]
2











, m= D, G.
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Proof of Lemma 2.6






d (3α+ 4) (2d − 2α− 1)− 2 (α+ 1)2






2d [d (2d + 1) (3α+ 4)− 2 (α+ 1)]





−2d [(4d + 1) (d −α− 1) + d (α+ 2)]







2d2 (α+ 2) + d −α− 1






2d (2d (3α+ 2) + 2α+ 1) (d −α− 1)





−2d (d + 1) (4d − 1) (α+ 1)
(2d + 1) (4d +α+ 3dα) ((2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1)
A< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Summing the corresponding expressions from Lemmas 2.3 and 2.5, we obtain:
e0 − eG =
4 [d (2α+ 3)−α− 1]
(2d − 1) ((2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1)
A> 0,
q0 − qG =
4d (3d − 1)−α (2d − 1)
 
−8d + 2d2 + 1

−α2 (d − 1) (2d − 1)2
(2d − 1) (4d + 3dα−α) ((2d − 1) (4d + 3dα+α) + 4d − 1)
A

< 0 if α > bαq(d)
> 0 if α < bαq(d)
,





+ dα2 (16d − 15) + 10dα (5d − 3) + 12d (3d − 1)





2 (2d − 1) (d − 1)

8d − 2d2 − 1+
p
4d2 + 16d3 + 4d4 + 1

with




bα2q (2d − 1) (4d − 3) + bαq
 
18d2 − 20d + 3








(3d − 1) + 5bα2q (2d − 1)
 < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5



















− (23α+ 20) (3α+ 2)−
 
73α+ 58α2 + 24





















> 0 if dD < d (α)





16− 13α+α2 + (8−α) (dD − 3) + 2 (2α+ 3) (1−α) d2D
Ω0Ω1
A> 0,




Sufficiency of second-order conditions




= (1+α) (1− 2xD − 2eD)− xG − eG − kc − xD = 0,
∂ πG
∂ xG
= 1− xD − eD − 2xG − 2eG − c − xG = 0.
The second-order conditions are sufficient for a maximum as
∂ 2πD
∂ x2D
= −3− 2α < 0 and
∂ 2πG
∂ x2G
= −3< 0, respectively.












+µ (xD + eD) ((1+α) (1− xD − eD)− xG − eG − kc)− x2D/2
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The first-order conditions are:
∂W
∂ eD
= µA+ (1− 2µ) (1+α) (xD + eD) + (1− 2µ) (xG + eG)− dDeD = 0,
∂W
∂ eG
= µA+ (1− 2µ) (xD + eD) + (1− 2µ) (xG + eG)− dGeG = 0.
The second-order conditions are sufficient for a maximum as
∂ 2W
∂ e2D
= (1− 2µ) (1+α)− dD < 0,
∂ 2W
∂ e2G










= (dD − (1− 2µ) (1+α)) (dG − (1− 2µ) (1+α))− (1− 2µ)
2
> [2 (1+α)− (1− 2µ) (1+α)]2 − (1− 2µ)2
= (α+ 2αµ+ 2) (α+ 4µ+ 2αµ)
> 0,
for dm > 2 (1+α).
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Chapter 3
Taxes versus emission standards: Welfare
consequences and innovation incentives of electric
vehicle adoption policies
Overview. We compare which of the two policy instruments −emission standard and
acquisition tax− induces a larger adoption of electric vehicles, higher innovation effort,
and social welfare. A Cournot oligopoly model with multi-product firms that vertically
differentiate their products is used to derive the equilibrium results. Emission standards offer
greater innovation incentives, total output, firms’ profits, and social welfare as compared
to acquisition taxes. Acquisition taxes allow for a major adoption of electric vehicles than
emission standards. However, as long as environmental damages are not too large and when
the tax revenues are redistributed, consumers prefer an acquisition tax. Otherwise, they are
better off under an emission standard.
JEL classification: O38; Q55; Q58; L51.
Keywords: Environmental regulation, Emission standards, Acquisition tax, Innovation, Electric
vehicles, Fuel-powered vehicles.
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3.1 Introduction
The transition from fuel-powered to electric vehicles has become a major policy concern in
most developed countries. As a consequence, there is a growing interest in the analysis of
the different environmental policies that can facilitate the adoption of the electric vehicles.
Despite the vast theoretical literature that has evolved comparing various environmental
policy instruments, its results cannot directly be applied to the automobile market. This
is for several reasons. First, many studies have focused on the incentives to innovation of
different environmental policies, and not on their welfare implications, which are core in
the automobile market. Second, standard models are based on markets with homogeneous
goods, and often assume monopoly or duopoly competition, while automobile markets are
characterised by demand for vertically differentiated products and oligopoly competition
among multi-product firms. Consequently, the focus of this chapter is to compare the market
performance and welfare implications of the most commonly applied environmental policies
aimed to spur the adoption of electric vehicles.
The two most important environmental policies in the automobile market are emission
standards and financial incentives to the purchase of electric vehicles. Emission standards
in the automobile industry take the form of performance standards that limit the amount
of emissions per vehicle. These standards have become more and more stringent over the
last decades in order to meet the emission levels assigned to individual countries in the
corresponding climate summits (e.g., Kyoto 1997; Copenhagen 2003; Paris 2016; Madrid
2019). As observed in Table 3.1, performance standards vary not only among countries, but
also states inside the US. Interestingly, the most severe standards are nowadays applied in
China in all of the three most relevant emission indicators: carbon monoxides (CO), nitrogen
oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (PM). With regards to the stringency of CO and NOx
emission standards, China is followed by California and New York, and in what concerns PM
emissions, by the European Union and countries that impose the Euro 6 emission standard
levels (e.g., Norway). The stringency of emission standards can explain part of the observed
variation in the market share of electric vehicles as, for example, between California and
Mississippi, West Virginia, or Louisiana. However, it does not explain the differences observed
in the market share of electric vehicles between Norway and other countries that apply Euro
6 emission standard levels (e.g., Germany, France or the UK).
Financial incentives take the form either of subsidies or, most commonly, tax rebates
in the acquisition of electric vehicles. Table 3.2 displays the financial incentives for the
purchase of electric vehicles considering the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP)
and the final retail price in 2018, for two comparable models of the Volkswagen Golf (110
TSI Comfortline gasoline and SEL Premium 134-hp Automatic e-Golf). Financial incentives
are measured as the difference in the final retail price of both vehicle models as compared
to the existing price difference in the MSRP of the two models. As observed in Table 3.2,
these financial incentives also vary substantially among countries, being Norway the country
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Table 3.1: Emission standards and market shares.
Emission Standards Market share of EV
Type of Emissions Countries CO NOx PM 2017 2018
California 0.6 0.01 0.006 5.02% 7.84%
LEV III (2015-2025) New York 0.6 0.01 0.006 1.03% 1.56%
Mississippi 2.1 0.04 - 0.15% 0.22%
Tier 3 (2017-2025) West Virginia 2.1 0.04 - 0.15% 0.27%
Louisiana 2.1 0.04 - 0.15% 0.28%
The Netherlands 1 0.06 0.005 1.80% 5.40%
Norway 1 0.06 0.005 20.08% 49.10%
Germany 1 0.06 0.005 0.70% 1.10%
Austria 1 0.06 0.005 1.50% 2.00%
Euro 6 (2014) UK 1 0.06 0.005 0.50% 0.60%
France 1 0.06 0.005 1.20% 1.40%
Spain 1 0.06 0.005 0.30% 0.50%
Italy 1 0.06 0.005 0.10% 0.30%
China 6b (2020) China 0.5 0.035 0.003 1.80% 3.89%
Emission standards for gasoline passenger vehicles (g/km) and market share of electric vehicles (EV).
Recent applied emission standards for gasoline passenger vehicles and market share of electric vehicles
in EU, Norway, USA, and China. Specifically in the US, these emissions are for passenger vehicles at
50,000 miles/5 years. The US legislation on air quality and vehicle emissions is a combination of
federal law, and stricter Californian standards (known as LEV), which are voluntarily applied by other
States. Sources: Market share of electric vehicles ICCT (2020) (for EU), and IEA (2018) (for USA,
China and Norway). Emission standards DGIP (2016) (for EU and USA), and TransportPolicy.net
(2018) (for China).
providing the highest incentives for the purchase of electric vehicles (122.10%), which
converts the 11,175$-price disadvantage of the electric vehicle into a 2,434$-price advantage.
High financial incentives are also provided by the states of California (73.71%) and New York
(66.31%), and China (52.99%) such that the importance of financial incentives correlates
positively with the market share of electric vehicles.1
In this chapter, we compare the two most prominently applied environmental policies
in the automobile market aimed to abate the emissions caused by vehicles with combustion
engines. Specifically, we compare an emission standard (a command-and-control instrument)
and an acquisition tax (a market-based instrument) with regards to their innovation incent-
ives, market performance, and welfare implications. The analysis is based on an oligopoly
model, in which multi-product firms that produce fuel-powered and electric vehicles compete
á la Cournot. Firms can abate the emissions of fuel-powered vehicles by means of investment
1In fact, based on the data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, a basic regression model of the form y = α+ β1F I + β2FC D+
β3ES + ε, reveals that financial incentives (F I) have the highest explanatory content for the market share of
electric vehicles (y) as compared to emission standards (ES) and fuel cost differences (FC D).
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in emission-reducing innovation. In a two-stage game, in the first stage, the regulator chooses
the environmental instrument in such a way that the first-best level of emissions is achieved.
In the second stage, firms make their quantity and innovation choices.
From the analysis, three major findings are obtained. First, regarding firms’ equilibrium
decisions, we find that an acquisition tax allows a major adoption of electric vehicles than
an emission standard. By contrast, under an emission standard, firms produce more fuel-
powered vehicles and exert a higher innovation effort. The intuition behind this result is that
an acquisition tax changes the relative prices of electric and fuel-powered vehicles, making
the latter more expensive, and eliminates any innovation stimulus. Instead, an emission
standard does not alter the relative prices and maintains innovation incentives. Overall, we
find that the total vehicle production is larger under an emission standard than under an
acquisition tax. Second, consumers are always better off under an emission standard than
under an acquisition tax, when tax revenues are not redistributed. This finding is explained
by the fact that consumers can purchase more vehicles in total under an emission standard
more than compensates the lower quantity of (the higher valued) electric vehicles. Instead,
when tax revenues are redistributed, an acquisition tax is preferred by consumers as long as
environmental damages are not too large. Third, firms’ profits and social welfare are higher
under an emission standard than under an acquisition tax. The intuition behind this result is
that the lower innovation incentive and the price distortion effect of an acquisition tax turn
it to the welfare-inferior instrument as compared to an emission standard.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature.
Section 3.3 sets up the theoretical model. Section 3.4 provides the equilibrium results of the
different two-stage games under analysis. Section 3.5 compares the market outcomes and
welfare implications of an acquisition tax with an emission standard. Section 3.6 provides
conclusions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Literature Review
This study builds on and contributes to the previous literature on environmental policy,
which focuses on the types of policy instruments, with specific topics including pollution
abatement and control, market structure, innovation, and clean products such as electric
automobiles (Buchanan, 1969; Lee, 1975; David and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2010; Ouchida and
Goto, 2014; Shao et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2018; Bian et al., 2020). In what follows, we review
the literature closely related to our study, with research gaps and other details summarised
in Table 3.3 below.
First, we begin by briefly reviewing the extensive research done for environmental
policies that study different types of instruments: command and control (CAC) and market-
based instruments (MBIs). The pioneering work of Buchanan (1969) reveals that applying
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a pollution tax in a monopoly can reduce social welfare, with pollution being reduced
below the desirable level. Lee (1975) discusses Buchanan (1969)’s lack of attention given
to the market structure and fills it by analysing the performance of a pollution tax under
an oligopoly market. His results show that market structures have an important effect on
environmental taxation efficiency. Polinsky (1979) compares environmental subsidies with
taxes in a monopoly setting and finds that subsidies are less efficient than taxes in reducing
emissions in the long run. Conrad and Wang (1993) provide a comparison of emission
taxes and abatement subsidies under three market structures: perfect competition, oligopoly
competition, and a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. They study the impact of these
two instruments on firm output, total industry output, and the firms’ number in the market.
Their results reveal that emission taxes and subsidies affect the structure of the polluting firms
in opposite ways. Total output and total emissions decrease if emission taxes are levied. They
also find that a subsidy on abated emissions serves as an incentive to higher output under
each market structure. Cato (2010) investigates a three-part policy mixture of an emission
tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. His results show that this combination
of policy mixture works perfectly as the first-best outcome is always attained. In a Cournot
oligopoly, Gersbach and Requate (2004) examine how a tax-refunding scheme mimics a
tax-subsidy scheme. They suggest that a first-best outcome can be achieved by simultaneously
taxing emissions and subsidising output under both monopoly and Cournot oligopoly. Huang
et al. (2013) analyse a fuel-automobile (FA) supply chain and an electric-and-fuel automobile
(EA-FA) supply chain, under a subsidy incentive scheme that is implemented to promote the
adoption of electric automobiles (EAs) and control the air pollution. Their results indicate
that under a duopoly market, the incentive scheme is more effective in increasing the sales of
the EAs when consumers’ bargaining power is stronger. Luo et al. (2014) study the electric
vehicle supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer serving to heterogeneous consumers,
under a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. The subsidy ceiling results more effective
in influencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher
unit production cost. Moreover, the discount rate is more effective under lower production
cost. Their study suggests to include both a discount rate and a subsidy ceiling as a better
incentive scheme. In another study, Yu et al. (2018) examine consumer and manufacturer
subsidies. They analyse different settings for determining the optimal subsidy program and
study the conditions under which it is optimal for the government to subsidise consumers
only, manufacturers only, or both. Their analysis reveals that the structure of the optimal
subsidy program depends on whether there is a well-established market selling price for the
products. It also depends on the relative emphasis that the government places on consumers
welfare versus manufacturer profits. However, they suggest that governments can improve
consumer welfare by using subsidy programs that involve competing manufacturers with
different market sizes and adequate capacities.
More related to this study, several scholars investigate firms’ innovation efforts (R&D)
on the production of clean output, in addition to environmental policies imposed by the
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government. Denicolo (1999) finds that taxes and permits are fully equivalent if the govern-
ment can commit to a perfectly competitive market. When the government pre-commits,
taxes give a higher incentive to invest in R&D than permits. By using a Cournot oligopoly
model, Montero (2002) compares firms’ R&D incentives under four environmental policy
instruments: two CAC instruments (emission and performance standards) and two MBIs
(tradable and auction permits). His results indicate that emission and performance standards
(CAC instruments) provide greater innovation incentives than tradable and auction permits
(MBIs). But, under perfectly competitive markets, tradeable and auctioned permits (MBIs)
provide equal innovation incentives that are similar to those offered by emission standards
and greater than those offered by performance standards (both CAC instruments). However,
these results depend on two effects: the direct or cost-minimising effect (always positive),
and the strategic effect resulting from the influence of firm’s R&D investment on the other
firm’s output choice (either positive or negative). David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2010) model
pollution taxes and abatement subsidies in an oligopoly market, where firms innovate for
the production of a homogeneous good. The regulator deals with two simultaneous price
distortions: one coming from pollution and the other caused by the clean firms’ market
power. Consequently, they show that taxing emissions while subsidising polluters’ innovation
efforts cannot lead to first-best. The opposite occurs when it is the clean firm’s output which
is subsidised. Welfare can be higher if the regulator uses only an emission tax in the case
when public transfers also create distortions. Under a duopoly and laissez-faire setting with
homogeneous products, Ouchida and Goto (2014) analyse emission taxes (subsidies). Their
results show that social welfare under an emission tax (emission subsidy) policy is always
welfare-enhancing under a duopoly compared to laissez-faire. If the environmental damage
is sufficiently small, the equilibrium emission tax rate is negative and so behaving as an
emission subsidy. Total emissions in a duopoly under the emission subsidy scenario are
less than those under laissez-faire if the damage is sufficiently small, and the R&D cost is
low. If R&D cost is high and the damage is sufficiently small, total emissions in a duopoly
under an emission subsidy are greater than those under laissez-faire. Moner-Colonques
and Rubio (2016) compare an emission standard (CAC instrument) with an emission tax
(MBI) in a monopoly market with innovation. They evaluate the strategic behaviour of
a polluting monopolist to influence environmental policy by using these two instruments.
Their results show that under non-commitment, the strategic behaviour of the firm leads to
more environmental innovation and higher welfare than under regulatory commitment with
a tax policy. The contrary occurs if an emission standard is applied. Under commitment,
both policy instruments are equivalent. However, the emission tax is suggested as an optimal
environmental policy because it yields the same welfare level as an emission standard for a
committed regulator and larger welfare for a non-committed regulator. Amir et al. (2018)
compare firms’ incentives to invest in R&D under two CAC instruments such as emission and
performance standards. They analyse the impact of these environmental instruments on
R&D incentives, equilibrium industry output, and welfare under a two-and-three-stage game.
Their study reveals that performance standard is welfare superior to the emission standard
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when firms invest in innovation. In another study, Bian et al. (2020) examine the effect of
two environmental subsidy policies, namely, consumer and manufacturer subsidies on the
incentives of investing in emission-reducing technologies. They find that consumer subsidy
yields a lower abatement and higher consumption quantity than manufacturer subsidy, un-
der a monopoly market with homogeneous products. Unlike Bian et al. (2020), we focus
specifically on the automobile market using two different environmental instruments.
Another strand of the literature related to our study focuses on environmental policies
applied for the case of the automobile market considering vertically differentiated products.
By using a duopoly model of vertical differentiation Ahmed and Segerson (2007) compare
two different policy instruments, a quota (MBI) and an average efficiency standard (CAC), in
terms of their effectiveness in reducing emissions, in the automobile market with diesel and
gasoline cars. Their results reveal that the optimal policy choice depends on the magnitude of
unit damages. However, the quota policy is more preferable in terms of welfare and profits, as
long as unit damages are sufficiently high. Under a duopoly market with gasoline and electric
vehicles, Shao et al. (2017) examine the effect of two MBI instruments such as government
subsidies and price discount schemes on promoting the adoption of electric vehicles. It
results that the demand for electric vehicles, the consumer surplus, the environmental
impact, and the social welfare are identical under two incentive schemes. However, the
government prefers to implement a subsidy incentive scheme due to the lower expenditure
involved. Furthermore, the electric vehicles market in the monopoly setting has a smaller
environmental impact than that in the duopoly setting, if a subsidy incentive scheme is being
used. Theilen and Tomori (2021) analyse an oligopoly model with vertically differentiated
products (i.e., diesel and gasoline cars). They investigate the effect of regulatory capture in
the automobile industry related to emissions and environmental innovation. Their results
reveal that regulatory capture only leads to more emissions and less innovation effort under
a multi-product monopoly, while the opposite is true under oligopoly competition. These
different results are due to a competition intensifying effect which is only present with
at least two firms in the market. In addition to Ahmed and Segerson (2007), Shao et al.
(2017), and similar to Theilen and Tomori (2021), we consider an oligopoly automobile
market with vertically differentiated products such as fuel-powered and electric vehicles. We
concentrate on two-stage game analysis, in which the regulator sets optimal environmental
standards (e) or implements an acquisition tax (t). During the game, the regulator makes
policy decisions, and manufacturer responds to these policies by determining its production
quantity, innovation effort, and emissions abatement level. To sum up, the comparison of
our work and other literature is also summarised in Table 3.3 below.
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Table 3.3: Summary of the literature.
Relevant Literature Instruments Market Product Innovation
MBI CAC Monopoly Duopoly Oligopoly Homogeneous Differentiated
Buchanan (1969) x x x x
Lee (1975) x x x
Polinsky (1979) x
Conrad and Wang (1993) x x
Denicolo (1999) x x x x
Montero (2002) x x x x x
Gersbach and Requate (2004) x x x
Ahmed and Segerson (2007) x x x x
Cato (2010) x x x x
David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2010) x x x x
Huang et al. (2013) x x x
Luo et al. (2014) x x x
Ouchida and Goto (2014) x x x x
Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2016) x x x x x
Shao et al. (2017) x x x x
Amir et al. (2018) x x x x
Yu et al. (2018) x x x
Bian et al. (2020) x x x x
Theilen and Tomori (2021) x x x x x x x
This chapter x x x x x
The (CAC) represents the command-and-control instruments, while (MBI) the market based instru-
ments.
3.3 The model
In this section, we describe the setup of the model considering the demand, production,
and environmental damage. We analyse the impact of two environmental policies in the
automobile market with n firms that produce both electric and fuel-powered vehicles. All
manufacturers maximise their expected profit, while the government offers either an emission
standard (e) or an acquisition tax (t).
Demand
Consider a market of vertical product differentiation, with two types of vehicles, electric
(E) and fuel-powered (F). For simplicity and keeping the analysis tractable, we assume a
continuum of consumers varying in their willingness to pay, denoted by θ , which is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] such that demand is linear in price. Consumer heterogeneity with
respect to their valuation for the vehicles is allowed. This in turn affects consumer’s desire
to either buy a single car (fuel-powered or electric) or not to buy any car. The utility of a
consumer of type θ in each of these cases is given by
UθE = (1+α)θ − pE, (3.1)
UθF = θ − pF − t, and (3.2)
Uθ0 = 0, (3.3)
where pE and pF denote the price of the electric vehicle and the fuel-powered vehicle,
respectively. Moreover, without loss of generality, we assume α > 0. It means that electric
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vehicles are of higher utility for consumers such that for the same price, all consumers prefer
the electric vehicle type.2 The consumer specific parameter θ may be interpreted as the
number of kilometres that consumers drive each year or as consumer’s valuation for the
services provided by the vehicle. In this case, under pE > pF , the lower energy price of
electric vehicles (α > 0) implies that frequent drivers purchase electric vehicles and casual
drivers fuel-powered vehicles. Equations (3.1)-(3.3) yield the critical values for buying an
electric vehicle, a fuel-powered vehicle, or no vehicle. Consumers buy an electric vehicle if
UθE ≥ U
θ
F , i.e., θ ≥
pE − pF − t
α
≡ θ , (3.4)





F > 0, i.e., θ > θ > pF + t ≡ θ . (3.5)
For α= 0 consumers exclusively buy the cheaper car, and when pE = pF = θ , both types of
car share the market evenly, i.e., qE = qF = 1− θ/2.3
Given the prices of fuel-powered and electric vehicle, consumers purchase: (i) an
electric vehicle if θ ∈ [θ , 1]; (ii) a fuel-powered vehicle if θ ∈ [θ ,θ]; (iii) no vehicle if
θ ∈ [0,θ]. Consequently, for α > 0, the following demand functions are obtained:
qE = 1− θ = 1−
pE − pF − t
α
, (3.6)
qF = θ − θ =
pE − pF − t
α
− ( pF + t) , (3.7)
and their corresponding inverse demand functions:
pE = (1+α) (1− qE)− qF , (3.8)
pF = 1− qF − qE − t. (3.9)
The consumer surplus is defined as the aggregate true utility of all consumers participating
in the car market. Specifically, the consumer surplus is derived by integrating the utilities
of consumers with respect to the valuation parameter θ over purchasing electric vehicle,















2If we decompose, following the vertical product differentiation model of Prescott and Visscher (1977), with
linear demands as in Bresnahan (1987), and specifically for the automobile market of Ahmed and Segerson
(2007), α=ωE −ωF −
 




, where ωm is the quality, p
e
m the unit price of energy and rm the energy
consumption of each car type (m = E, F), a positive value of α means that, for cars of the same quality, the
energy cost of electric cars is lower than that of fuel-powered cars. As observed in Table 3.2, this has been the
case over the past decades in the European Union, U.S., and China.
3In the case that pE = pF = θ , both types of car share the market equally, i.e., qE = qF = 1− 2θ = 1− pE − pF .
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Production
In this model, there are n multi-product firms indexed i that produce two types of
automobiles: electric and fuel-powered vehicles. Production costs are linear with CFi(qF) =
cqF and CEi(qE) = kcqE, where 0 < c < 1, and k ∈ [k, k] is assumed due to the high cost
of battery. The parameter k denotes the cost coefficient of an electric vehicle relative to a
fuel-powered vehicle, with k = α+1+ βdc and k =
α+c
c , where β ≡ α+nα+1. Assuming that
each unit of output generates one unit of pollution in the case of fuel-powered vehicles, the
firms’ emissions can be written as ei = qFi − xFi . Hence, xF stands for the emission-reducing
innovation in the production of fuel-powered vehicles. As it is common in the literature (see
e.g., Moner-Colonques and Rubio, 2016; Montero, 2002; Petrakis and Xepapadeas, 2001),




per unit damage caused by pollution is assumed to increase with the emission level such
that the total damage is given by D = D (e) = de, where d ∈ [d, d], with d = α(1−c)β(n+1) and
d = α(1−c)β .
4 The damage d is caused only by the pollution emitted by fuel-powered vehicles,
while electric cars do not directly pollute the environment.5 From the above, it follows that
firms’ profits stemming from the production of fuel-powered-and-electric vehicles are:
πEi = qEi ((1+α) (1− qE)− qF − kc) , (3.11)




respectively, with qE =
∑n
i=1 qEi and qF =
∑n
i=1 qFi . Different market structures according to
their degree of competitiveness are considered, i.e., laissez-faire market equilibrium, social
optimum and multi-product oligopoly.
Environmental regulation
The regulator constrains the level of pollution generated by the production of fuel-
powered vehicles by using an emission standard e =
∑n
i=1 ei as a command-and-control
instrument. An acquisition tax t, as a market based instrument can be also used to incentivise
the adoption of electric vehicles. The regulator determines the policies that allow to achieve
the first-best emission levels. Social optimum case is considered, with a welfare function
maximised as following:
SW = CS +π+ tqF − D, (3.13)
where D represents total damages in the environment. Thereby, the formulation of the
welfare function in (3.13) captures important aspects of regulatory practices.
4These conditions guarantee non-negative equilibrium values and simplify the exposition of the results. Specific-
ally, d guarantees that k > k; d that e0 − e∗ > 0; k that q0E > 0; and k that q
t∗
F > 0.
5Notice that fuel-powered cars are considered as harmful due to the fact that they pollute the environment
by emitting emissions. This is the reason why many countries have set emission standards to protect the
environment (see Table 3.1 representing the emission standards for CO, NOx, and PM).
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Timing of the game
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 1, the regulator chooses the emission
standard e or acquisition tax t that allows to achieve the first-best emission levels. In Stage 2,
firms choose their environmental innovation effort for fuel-powered-cars xF and determine
their production levels qE and qF , respectively. As usual, the game is solved by backward
induction.
3.4 Equilibrium analysis
3.4.1 Laissez-faire market equilibrium
First consider the case in which firms can freely choose the level of emissions and there is
no policy intervention. Firm i determines its optimal production levels qFi and qEi , and the
innovation effort xFi by maximising the following profit function:
max
qEi ,qFi ,xFi
πi = qEi ((1+α) (1− qE)− qF − kc) + qFi (1− qF − qE − c)− x
2
Fi
/2, i = 1, ..., n,
(3.14)












(1− c)− qE, (3.16)
xF = 0. (3.17)
From (3.15) and (3.16), it can be observed that quantities of electric and fuel-powered
vehicles are strategic substitutes. The following result gives the equilibrium values.























∂ n > 0,
∂ q0E
∂ n > 0, and
∂ e0
∂ n > 0.
From the results in Lemma 3.1 it can be observed that firms do not invest in abatement
technology in the absence of any policy intervention. Moreover, as expected, equilibrium
quantities (and the level of emissions) increase with the degree of market competition, i.e.,
with the number of firms in the market.
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3.4.2 Social optimum
Now, consider the first-best allocation or social optimum, which is obtained by choosing the
total output of electric and fuel-powered vehicles, and the total innovation level (i.e., qE, qF ,












−d (qF − xF) . (3.18)
The following result is obtained.
























A comparison of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 indicates that without any policy intervention,
firms produce too many fuel-powered and not enough electric vehicles yielding an excess
of emissions. Moreover, it can be observed that the innovation effort exerted by firms is
sub-optimal.
3.4.3 Acquisition tax
As a first policy intervention aimed to reduce the level of emissions consider an acquisition
tax (t) on fuel-power vehicles, which is equivalent to a tax abatement on the acquisition of
electric vehicles. At Stage 2, firms determine their optimal quantities and innovation efforts
(i.e., qEi , qFi , xFi ) by maximising the following profit function:
max
qEi ,qFi ,xFi






























qEi − t − c

−x2Fi/2, for i = 1, ..., n.









c (k−α− 1)− t (α+ 1)
α (n+ 1)
, (3.21)
x tF = 0, (3.22)
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At Stage 1, the regulator chooses the tax rate that allows to attain the first-best emission













Substituting 3.23 into (3.20)-(3.22) yields the following result.
Lemma 3.3. Under an acquisition tax yielding the social optimal level of emissions, equilibrium
























, and x t
∗
F = 0.
The results in Lemma 3.3 in comparison with Lemma 3.2 indicate that with policy
intervention (i.e., acquisition tax), firms produce too many electric-vehicles and an equal
amount of fuel-powered vehicles yielding also the same level of emissions. Moreover, it can
be observed that the innovation effort exerted by firms is zero.
3.4.4 Emission standard
Now, as an alternative policy intervention, consider an emission standard that limits total
emissions to e. At Stage 2, firms determine their optimal quantities and innovation effort by
maximising the following profit function:
max
qEi ,qFi ,xFi




s.t. qFi ≤ ei + xFi , for i = 1, ..., n, (3.25)
yielding the stage-2 equilibrium values:
qeE =
n (n+ 2) (α− ck) + n (c + 1+ cn)− (n+ 1) e
(n+ 1) (2α+ nα+ 1)
, (3.26)
qeF =




cn (k−α− 1)−α (n+ 1) e
2α+ nα+ 1
. (3.28)
and ee = e.
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At Stage 1, the regulator chooses the optimal emission standard by solving: e = e∗.








Substituting 3.29 into equations 3.26 to 3.28 yields the following result.
Lemma 3.4. Under an emission standard yielding the social optimal level of emissions, equilib-



































The results in Lemma 3.4 in comparison with Lemma 3.3 show that the quantity for
both types of vehicles and innovation effort increases for the same level of emissions. The
number of firms n competing in the market plays an important role in determining these
equilibrium results.
3.5 Policy comparison
In this section, acquisition taxes and emission standards are compared with regards to the
impact on quantities, innovation effort and consumer welfare. First, a comparison of the
equilibrium values obtained in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 yields the following result.
Proposition 3.1. As compared to an acquisition tax causing the same level of total emissions,
an emission standard yields:























Proposition 3.1 reveals that an acquisition tax yields more electric and less fuel-powered
vehicles than an emission standard. The intuition behind this result is that an acquisition
tax changes the relative prices of electric and fuel-powered vehicles, making the latter more
expensive. As a consequence, consumers in equilibrium demand more electric and less
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fuel-powered vehicles. Instead, an emission standard does not alter the relative prices, but
incentivises increased innovation effort to produce cleaner fuel-powered vehicles which
is totally abandoned under an acquisition tax. Interestingly, this result is in line with the
findings of Montero (2002) who shows that under Cournot competition, command-and-
control instruments provide greater innovation incentives than market-based instruments.
Regarding total output, the second statement in Proposition 3.1 indicates that the policy
impact on fuel-powered vehicles dominates the one on electric vehicles such that total output
is larger under an emission standard.
From the previous discussion it is not clear which of the two policies is preferred from
the consumers’ perspective. While an emission standard yields more fuel-powered and total
vehicles, under an acquisition tax, there is a larger number of electric vehicles which are
higher valued by consumers. The next result elucidates which of the two policies is preferred
by consumers.
Proposition 3.2. If acquisition taxes are not redistributed to consumers, consumers are better





taxes are fully redistributed to consumers and environmental damages are high, emission
standards are also preferable to acquisition taxes, while with low environmental damages taxes
are preferable, i.e., CSe





An important difference between acquisition taxes and emission standards is that the
former allow to raise revenues such that their assignment becomes crucial for the comparison
of both policies. As it turns out, when the tax revenues raised by means of the acquisition tax
do not benefit consumers at all, they are better off under an emission standard. This indicates
that the fact that under an emission standard consumers can purchase more vehicles in total
more than compensates the lower quantity of (the higher valued) electric vehicles.
If acquisition taxes are fully redistributed to consumers, Proposition 3.2 shows that the
impact of the two policies on consumer surplus depends on the environmental damage. The
intuition for the role of d comes from the tax revenue obtained under the acquisition tax.
From equation (3.23), it can be observed that the optimal tax rate increases with d, while
qt
∗
F does not depend on d (see Lemma 3.3). Consequently, for higher values of d, more tax
revenues are redistributed to consumers such that acquisition taxes become the preferred
policy alternative.
Next, consider the consequences of the two policies for manufacturers and total welfare.
The following result is obtained.
Proposition 3.3. Firms’ profits and social welfare are higher under an emission standard than
under an acquisition tax.
The result in Proposition 3.3 indicates that firms prefer an emission standard that
stimulates them to invest in emission-reducing innovation to produce cleaner fuel-powered
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vehicles rather than an acquisition tax that changes the relative prices of electric and fuel-
powered vehicles. Moreover, it turns out that this profit gain under an emission standard
more than compensates a possible loss in consumer surplus when environmental damages
are low. Consequently, social welfare is always higher under an emission standard than
under an acquisition tax. This result is opposed to what is usually found in the literature
(see e.g., Moner-Colonques and Rubio, 2016; Ahmed and Segerson, 2007), that states that
market-based instruments (emission taxes) yield higher welfare than command-and-control
instruments (emission standards). This difference in the results can be explained by two
facts. First, while an emission tax affects both the quantity (negatively) and the innovation
effort (positively), an acquisition tax only distorts the demand of the good. Consequently, an
emission tax provides more innovation incentives than an acquisition tax. Second, while the
above literature considers markets with homogeneous products, this study considers a market
of vertically differentiated goods. Therefore, changes in the price of the polluting good (fuel-
powered vehicles) imply substitution effects with the non-polluting good (electric vehicles).
The results in this paper indicate that together both effects (lower innovation incentives
and price distortion effects) turn taxes to the welfare-inferior instrument as compared to
emission standards.
3.6 Conclusions
The policy choice by the regulators for increasing firms’ environmental innovation effort,
and electric vehicles’ adoption has created a persistent debate in the automobile market
of different countries. In this chapter, we compare the impact of two policy instruments
(emission standards and acquisition taxes) in their innovation incentives, market performance,
and welfare implications. The analysed model depicts an oligopoly automobile market, in
which multi-product firms that produce fuel-powered and electric vehicles compete á la
Cournot.
The results indicate that there are more electric vehicles produced under an acquisition
tax than under an emission standard. A reason for this is that an acquisition tax changes
the relative prices of electric and fuel-powered vehicles making the latter more expensive.
As a consequence, consumers in equilibrium demand more electric and less fuel-powered
vehicles. However, the policy impact on fuel-powered vehicles dominates the one on electric
vehicles such that total output is larger under an emission standard.
Considering the automobile market, this chapter reveals the fact that an emission
standard provides greater innovation incentives than an acquisition tax. In addition, we
find that if acquisition taxes are not redistributed to consumers, they are better off under an
emission standard than under an acquisition tax. If acquisition taxes are fully redistributed to
consumers, the impact of the two policies on consumer surplus depends on the environmental
damage. The intuition for the role of environmental damage comes from the tax revenue
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obtained under the acquisition tax. Thus, for higher values of damage, more tax revenues
are redistributed to consumers such that acquisition taxes become the preferred policy
alternative.
This study also presents the impact of the two policy instruments on the firms’ profits
and total welfare. Firms prefer an emission standard that stimulate them to invest in emission-
reducing innovation for producing cleaner fuel-powered vehicles rather than an acquisition
tax that changes the relative prices of electric and fuel-powered vehicles. With regards to
social welfare, it is always higher under an emission standard than under an acquisition tax.
This result can be explained by two effects such as the effect of lower innovation incentives
and price distortion.
Several directions can be considered for further research. Firstly, although this study
focuses on fuel-powered and electric automobiles, the results of this analysis can be applied
easily to environmental regulation policies related to the batteries of electric vehicles, for
example. Other practical markets and situations with environmental issues can apply this
model and check the consistency of obtained results. Secondly, empirical studies can be
performed to compare different environmental policies across different regions and countries.
Furthermore, this study suggests an important policy implication that a mixture of these
two policies can contribute to obtaining efficient results in terms of clean output and higher
innovation incentives. Finally, other environmental policies can also be examined and
compared with these two policies to generate more managerial and policy insights.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1



































− qFi = 0,
∂ πi
∂ xFi
= −xFi = 0.
Summing over all firms, the following system of equations is obtained:
n (1+α) (1− qE)− nqF − nkc − qE (1+α)− qF = 0,
−qE + n− nqF − nqE − nc − qF = 0,
xF = 0.










































α > 0. The equilibrium emissions are
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Proof of Lemma 3.2
The first-order conditions from maximising (3.18) are:
∂ SW
∂ qE
= − (1+α)qE + (1+α− kc)− qF = 0,
∂ SW
∂ qF






+ d = 0.




























Proof of Lemma 3.4
Notice that the restriction (3.25) in (3.24) is binding such that the maximisation problem




































From the first order conditions and summing over all firms yield the following reaction
functions:
qE =




n (α− ck+ 1)
n+ 1
− (α+ 1)qE,
from which we obtain the stage-2 equilibrium values:
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qeE =
n (n+ 2) (α− ck) + n (c + 1+ cn)− (n+ 1) e
(n+ 1) (α+ β)
,
qeF =




cn (k−α− 1)−α (n+ 1) e
α+ β
.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Comparison of quantities.
Comparing the equilibrium quantities of electric vehicles and fuel-based cars in Lemmas






























Comparison of total output.
























(α+ 1) (α+ β)
> 0.
Comparison of innovation effort.















Proof of Proposition 3.2
First, lets define
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(α+ 1) (α+ β)
> 0.

















Now, considering that tax revenues are not redistributed to the consumers, a comparison of



























































































































F + (α+ 1) z

> 0.
Next, considering that tax revenues are totally redistributed to consumers. Then, a









































This expression is monotonically increasing in d, negative for low values of d and positive



























































< 0 for d < ed
> 0 for d > ed
,
where ed is implicitly defined by CSe
∗ − CS t∗ − t∗qt∗F = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
























































































































































Moreover, using (3.30) and (3.31), regarding the comparison of social welfare we obtain:
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